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The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”)1 enacted sweeping
changes in the international tax provisions of the United States Internal Revenue Code. In particular, with respect to the corporate tax,
the enactment abandoned a historic “residence-based” or “global”
system and replaced it with a modified “territorial” system based
upon what the statute terms a “participation exemption” structure.2
Territorial systems visibly place great importance on determining how income is associated with a taxing jurisdiction. Historically,
this determination has been effected by two different but related sets
of rules: “source” rules, which have been mostly the subject of domestic laws of various countries, which assign to items of income
and deduction a geographic “source”;3 and “transfer pricing” rules,
which are the subject of some degree of international agreement, and
which allocate the tax base of integrated corporate entities among
the different jurisdictions from which such entities derive income.4
1

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2155 § 13543 (2017).
A global or residence-based system imposes tax on the global income of
individuals deemed subject to the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. It is not a
system which gives “primacy” to the authority of the jurisdiction based on personal characteristics over that of the jurisdiction based on the relationship to the
“origin” of the tax base, because it may cede primary authority to the latter, reserving only residual authority to the former. In the United States, authority to tax
incorporated entities has historically been based upon the jurisdiction under the
laws of which the entity is organized. See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(3)–(4) (2017) (providing the definition of “domestic” corporation).
A “territorial” system, by contrast, imposes tax solely on the basis of the relationship of the jurisdiction involved to the tax base: jurisdictions impose tax on income earned within their “territory,” irrespective of the relationship of the jurisdiction to the party to which the tax base is attributable. Thus, the “foreign” origin
tax base of domestic parties is exempt; but the “domestic” origin tax base of foreign entities is subject to tax.
The change effected by the TCJA was limited to corporations. Individuals and
unincorporated entities remain subject to the pre-existing “global” system, subject
to some major changes, the most significant of which are discussed in the text.
3
The rules defining the geographic “source” of taxable income under United
States law are set forth in Part I of Subchapter N of the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. §§ 861–65 (hereinafter “the Code”), and regulations thereunder.
4
The transfer pricing rules under United States law are for the most part set
forth in regulations under section 482 of the Code, a brief section which gives the
Treasury Department authority to allocate items of income, deduction, gain or loss
2
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The latter set of rules, by far the more important, have been the subject of near constant international controversy for over a half century.5 In recent years, this controversy has increasingly centered on
what is loosely, and with a grave degree of license, called “intangible” income6—by which is meant, for the most part, income from
what we would call intellectual property, patents, trademarks, copyrights, knowhow, and trade secrets. The problem of deciding the
jurisdictions to which such income is assignable has proved to be
intractable, even at the time the share such income constitutes of

or credit among entities or trades and business under “common control.” The regulations under these provisions are extensive and have a substantial and significant history, covered in parts II-IV infra.
Actually, there is a complication to this two-part schema, applicable under United
States law, but also pertinent to the laws of some foreign countries and the international rules. The transfer pricing rules, strictly speaking, apply where an enterprise of one state conducts business outside that state through separately incorporated entities. Enterprises also conduct business outside their home countries without forming separate corporations or other entities in the foreign state—through
foreign branches. This is most common in the banking and financial services sector. In the United States, where a foreign enterprise conducts business other than
through a separate corporation, the United States tax base is determined in the first
instance by the source rules, supplemented by rules which limit and expand the
base defined by those rules according to whether income is “effectively connected” with the United States business, a concept which excludes some United
States source income and includes some income which is foreign source. I.R.C.
§ 864 (2017). Income from foreign unincorporated branches is included in the tax
base of United States entities, subject to a foreign tax credit the magnitude of
which is limited by the source rules. This is true even after the TCJA, because that
law did not extend the “territoriality” principle to enterprises operating abroad
through unincorporated branches.
There is an alternative way of determining foreign branch income which does not
depend on the first category of rules (source rules), but rather on the latter (transfer
pricing rules). This method appears to be mandated by the model conventions of
international organizations, as well as most bilateral income taxation conventions
in force throughout the world. But this approach was never adopted by United
States regulations and never developed by the international organizations until
2002-2010. The manner in which those organizations did so is significant to the
discussion within and is described at length in Part IV infra.
5
These controversies and their resolution are detailed in Parts II-IV infra.
6
The nature of that license and the ambiguities involved are described in
Part I infra.
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total income earned worldwide has increased (and appears still to be
increasing) exponentially.7
The latest acute phase of these difficulties arose, and was partially or temporarily resolved, in the first of the decade of the 2010s
by what is known as the “base erosion and profit shifting” initiative
of the Group of 20, effected through the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).8 The initiative was
sparked by a series of press reports,9 backed by some academic
work,10 which exposed practices of certain multinational corporations, principally “based” in the United States, and most but by no
means all concentrated in the United States technology industry, by
means of which the enterprises reduced their overall tax rate (taxes
7
This confusion is manifest perhaps most visibly, and seriously, in a comprehensive study of transfer pricing undertaken by the Treasury Department in the
late 1980s at the express direction of Congress. UNITED STATES TREASURY DEP’T,
A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING 182–83 (1988) (issued as I.R.S. Notice 88–
123, 1988–2 C.B. 458). The disjunction is the root of what I and a co-author call
the “hybrid/schizophrenic” nature of the conclusions of that report. Stanley I.
Langbein & Max R. Fuss, The OECD/G20 BEPS Project and the Value Creation
Paradigm: Economic Reality Disemboguing into the Interpretation of the ‘Arm’s
Length’ Standard, 51 INT’L LAW. 259, 320–21 (2018); see also Michael J. Graetz
& Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the
Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1347 (2013);
Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for
Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79 (2008).
8
On the BEPS project generally, see Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7.
9
The most influential early articles were by the same author for Bloomberg
News. Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes with Global
Odyssey, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ (May 13, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201005-13/american-companies-dodge-60-billion-in-taxes-even-tea-party-wouldcondemn.html (tax activities of Forest Laboratories); Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4%
Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html; see also Charles Duhigg & David
Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aimsat-low-tax-states-and-nations.html; Zaid Jilani, Microsoft Structured Acquisition
Of Skype To Avoid U.S. Taxes, TʜɪɴᴋPʀᴏɢʀᴇss (May 13, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/2011/05/13/microsoft-skype-tax-havens.
10
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011);
Edward D. Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2011);
see also Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income:
Collection at Source is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535 (2012).
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paid to all countries) to near zero.11 In 2013, the OECD established
an “action plan,”12 divided into fifteen areas for action, and the
groups assigned to work on each action area produced two rounds
of documents recommending action. The first, published for the
most part between the late summer of 2014 and the late winter of
2015, were preliminary deliverables and discussion drafts, circulated for comment among the G-20 nations. The second were final
recommendations published for the most part in the autumn of 2015.
Among the fifteen action “items,” undoubtedly those of central importance concerned transfer pricing, Actions 8 through 10.13 For the
most part, the content of these 2015 reports constituted amendments
to and by 2017 were incorporated in the 2017 version of, the
OECD’s TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL

11

See Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey Lemaster, Double Irish More than Doubles the Tax Saving: Hybrid Structure Reduces Irish, US and Worldwide Taxation, 11 PRACTICAL U.S./INT’L TAX STRATEGIES 2 (2007); Jeffrey L. Rubinger &
William B. Sherman, Holding Intangibles Offshore May Produce Tangible Tax
Benefits, 106 Tᴀx Nᴏᴛᴇs 938 (2005).
The matter also triggered a series of congressional hearings in the United States.
Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 2 (Apple, Inc.), S. Hear.
113-90, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee of Homeland Security and Government Operations, May 21, 2013 available at www.fds.gov.; Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 1
(Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard.), S. Hear. 112-781, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee of Homeland Security and Government
Operations,
Sept.
20,
2012,
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76071/pdf/CHRG112shrg76071.pdf; Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 2 (Apple, Inc.), S. Hear. 113-90, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee of Homeland Security and Government Operations, May
21,
2013,
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg81657/pdf/CHRG-112shrg81657.pdf; Caterpillar’s Offshore Tax Strategy, S. Hear. 113-408, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee of Homeland Security and Government Operations, Apr. 1,
2014,
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg89253pdf/CHRG-112shrg89253.pdf.
12
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT-SHIFTING, (July 19, 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/action-plan-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting9789264202719-en.htm.
13
See Appendix (full text of Actions 8 through 10).
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ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS, “the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines,” or, more simply, “the Guidelines.”14
The United States participation in the development of the BEPS
standards was curious. The most recent two previous episodes of
transfer pricing controversy were instigated, all but unilaterally, by
the United States. In the first, the United States had issued far reaching and complex regulations in the late 1960s,15 and this led to the
formulation of the first version of the Guidelines, in 1979, which
largely followed the terms of the United States regulations.16 In the
second, the United States Congress had expressed dissatisfaction
with the function of the regulations formulated in the 1960s,17 and
this had led to an extended, decade long process of international negotiations concerning international transfer pricing standards, culminating with a revision of the Guidelines in 1995.18 Again, however, the United States issued regulations prior to the finalization of
the revision of the Guidelines,19 and again, the revisions of the
Guidelines followed the United States regulations, although this
time the differences were considerably more material, and some
touched even on conceptual matters.20
But those differences foreshadowed a real dissolution of the cohesion of United States and international principles after 1995.21 In

14

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS (2017) [hereinafter 2017 Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
15
TD 6998, 34 Fed. Reg 933 (Jan. 17, 1969); TD 6952, 33 Fed. Reg. 5848;
see Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 310–16.
16
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS (1979).
17
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, at II-638 (1986) (Conference Report on the
Tax Reform Act of 1986).
18
For an account of what these authors call the “great transfer pricing wars”
of the 1985-95 period, see Michael C. Durst & Robert Culbertson, Clearing Away
the Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer
Pricing Today, 57 TAX L. REV. 37 (2003); see also Langbein & Fuss, supra note
7, at 318–29.
19
TD 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34, 971 (July 8, 1994); see also TD 8632, 60 Fed.
Reg. 65, 553 (Dec. 19, 1995); Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 323–26 & n. 309.
20
Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 329–36.
21
See generally Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 341–63.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

7

the decade preceding BEPS, between 2000 and 2010, the OECD exhibited distinct consciousness of the difficulties which became a major focus of public concern after 2010. These concerns were manifested first in revisions of standards governing the allocation of income where a multinational enterprise operated in different countries through unincorporated branches or entities, rather than separately incorporated entities22 and second in rules specifying transfer
pricing consequences for transactions by which such entities rearranged their operations through their commonly controlled, separately incorporated entities.23 The United States participated in the
proceedings concerning these issues and thus in the development of
the revised standards. But the revised standards had no parallel
whatever in pre-existing United States policy or law, and both the
Congress, with regard to legislation, and the Treasury, with regard

22

The final results of this project were issued as Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ
Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ , Oɴ ᴛʜᴇ Aᴛᴛʀɪʙᴜᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏғ Pʀᴏғɪᴛs ᴛᴏ Pᴇʀᴍᴀɴᴇɴᴛ
Esᴛᴀʙʟɪsʜᴍᴇɴᴛs (2008) [hereinafter 2008 OECD PE Report]. The 2008 report
stated that Article 7 of the OECD Model Convention on the Taxation of Income
and Capital and the Commentary to that Convention would be revised in the next
update of the OECD’s Model Convention, then scheduled, and ultimately released, in 2010. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON TAXES ON INCOME
AND CAPITAL, art. 7 (2010). The final report also revised the Commentary to Article 7, effective with the 2010 update on the Model Convention, with respect to
matters that did not conflict with the pre-existing commentary. The report cautioned “taking care, when interpreting bilateral treaties that include the current
text of Article 7 . . . to use only the parts of the Report that do not conflict with
the Article 7 Commentary as so revised.” Id. at 8, ¶ 8. The various discussion
drafts and other preliminary reports leading to the final Guidelines are discussed
in The OECD/G20 BEPS Project and the Value Creation Paradigm: Economic
Reality Disemboguing into the Interpretation of the ‘Arm’s Length’ Standard.
Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 341–50.
23
The OECD’s final report on this initiative was issued as Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ
Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ
Asᴘᴇᴄᴛs ᴏғ Bᴜsɪɴᴇss Rᴇsᴛʀᴜᴄᴛᴜʀɪɴɢs: Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ IX ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ
Gᴜɪᴅᴇʟɪɴᴇs
(July
22,
2010),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/45690216.pdf. As that title indicates, the results of this project were incorporated into the Guidelines as a new Chapter IX, where they still appear. The various
discussion drafts and other preliminary reports leading to the final Guidelines are
discussed in The OECD/G20 BEPS Project and the Value Creation Paradigm:
Economic Reality Disemboguing into the Interpretation of the ‘Arm’s Length’
Standard. Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 350–63.
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to regulations, ignored the new standards and made no effort whatsoever to reflect them in United States statutory or regulatory law.
The BEPS initiative and the revision of the 2017 Guidelines represented in substantial part an extension of the principles elaborated
in these two earlier OECD efforts.24 And, in keeping with the United
States’ previous somnolence in regard to those rules, the United
States at first paid little attention to the new initiative, which, at least
as far as public manifestations were concerned, were spearheaded
by the major European powers (France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom).25 This dalliance ended abruptly, however, with the publication of the 2014 deliverables with regard to transfer pricing. The
United States played a very active role in the late stages of the BEPS
process by seeking, and achieving, significant revisions in the final
BEPS report (which became the revised Guidelines) all of which
pointed in the direction of diluting the degree to which the final report strengthened the hands of tax administrators in enforcing transfer pricing rules.26 And, largely as a result of the efforts of the United
States, the BEPS process over its life, from 2012 to 2017, moved
steadily from its initial promise of significant reform to a final product effecting genuinely minor reform.27
The adoption of a territorial system, with no transfer pricing reform, can readily be seen as a retreat, while the BEPS reform, even
cast in the most skeptical light, constitutes an advance. But the
TCJA did not stop with the enactment of “territoriality.” The TCJA
included three measures that at least on the surface addressed the
“base erosion” and “profit shifting” concerns of the international

24

See generally Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 341–89; Part III-IV infra.
See Patrick Wintour & Dan Milmo, UK and Germany Agree Crackdown
on Tax Loopholes for Multinationals: Osborne and Schauble Tackle “Profit Shifting” Changes in E-Commerce Leave Governments Trailing, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/nov/05/uk-germany-tax-loopholes-multinationals; Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 274 n. 80.
26
Brookings Institution, OECD BEPS Action Plan: Taking the Pulse on the
Americas Region, 18 BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (February 2016) (“Many of the
OECD’s recommendations have been revised to address US concerns about the
original
proposals.”)
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/bepsupdateamericas-manal-corwin-addition.pdf.
27
Id.
25
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community. The first two concerned the taxation of the foreign activities of United States persons28—the so-called “outbound” situation. The TCJA enacted a new, residual tax on what it calls the
“global intangible low-taxed income” (“GILTI”) of subsidiaries of
the United States corporations.29 At the same time, the TCJA enacted a second measure, applicable to activities of United States persons whose foreign activities are conducted through “branches,” that
is, without separate corporate entities to conduct the foreign activities, designed to equalize the taxation of such activities with the activities subject to the GILTI tax. Section 250(c) enacts a special deduction for this “foreign direct investment income” (“FDII”). The
third relevant provision applies to the United States activities of foreign persons, on whom new section 59A imposes a minimum tax,
called the “base erosion anti-abuse tax” (“BEAT”).30
But, with the enactment of the GILTI tax and the accompanying
base erosion and anti-abuse tax (“BEAT”), the United States’ response to BEPS is quite different from its response to the OECD’s
earlier Article 7 and restructuring initiatives. In the earlier episodes,
as noted, the United States stood still and quiet and made no changes
28
The GILTI tax is described in detail in Part V infra. United States persons
include citizens and residents of the United States; domestic corporations and domestic partnerships; and certain trusts and estates. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (2017).
The United States for these purposes includes only the fifty states and the District
of Columbia. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(9). Corporations or partnerships are “domestic” if
created or organized in the United States or under the laws of any state or of the
United States. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2017).
29
The GILTI tax applies to income imputed from “controlled foreign corporations” (“CFCs”) to United States persons who are “United States shareholders”
with respect to those CFCs. These terms derive from provisions in force before
the TCJA (and since 1962) under Subpart F of Part III of Subchapter N of the
Code. A CFC is a foreign corporation with more than 50 percent of the stock of
which (by vote or value) is owned by “United States shareholders,” I.R.C.
§ 957(a), and a “United States shareholder” is defined as any United States person
who owns ten percent or more of the value or voting power of the stock of the
corporation. For these purposes, ownership is determined using certain “constructive ownership” rules, I.R.C. § 958(a)-(b), which impute ownership to a person
stock owned by certain closely related individuals or entities. These constructive
ownership rules were amended by TCJA in ways which greatly expand the number of foreign corporations which will be treated as CFCs, and the identity of
United States persons who will be treated as United States shareholders.
30
As with the GILTI provisions, the FDII and BEAT provisions are detailed
in Part V infra.

10
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in its law at all. But now the United States has effected major statutory change. The GILTI tax does not by its terms affect the transfer
pricing rules, but it greatly affects the consequences of many if not
most transfer pricing determinations and squarely concerns the major issue which motivated the BEPS transfer pricing efforts if not the
entire BEPS process itself, viz., the taxation of income from intangible property, or, more generally “intangible income.” So too the
FDII and BEAT provisions.
At the same time, the enactment of these provisions poses some
interesting, if odd, questions. Underlying these are the circumstances that the statutory changes, while involving the same policy
concerns as the BEPS report, in no way adopt or even reflect the
rules, recommendations, or principles of those reports, except perhaps for the cursory use of the term (or shibboleth) “base erosion.”
So, in this circumstance, while the United States response differs
from the earlier interludes in that there is a response, the United
States response in common with the earlier moments virtually ignores the substantive standards elaborated by the international
body. This is stranger still in light of the historical pattern of congruence of the two sets of standards and even more in light of the
pattern of American leadership—one could even say domination—
of the development of standards.
And these circumstances lead to the question of just what is contemporary United States policy toward the taxation of income from
intangible property. The United States, after all, subscribed to, and
played a significant role in, the OECD BEPS standards, so why influence, or even vote for, standards the nation intended, probably all
along, to ignore? The aim of this piece is to explore this question of
the content, going forward, of the substantive congressional and administrative policy in regard to taxing cross border income derived
from intellectual or other intangible property, as well as the shares
of the profits of multinational enterprises that cannot be definitively
linked to identified factors of production.

2019]
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“INTANGIBLE INCOME”

A.

The question of “intangibles.”
If we are to discuss “global low-taxed intangible income,” we
might logically if somewhat facilely start by identifying what may
be meant by “intangible income.” The term has a critical ambiguity,
greatly inflamed by contemporary United States commentary, which
is best drawn out at the outset. Narrowly, the term may mean income
from “intangible property”; by the latter term, we may mean intellectual property (patents, copyrights, secret processes, trade secrets
generally), but also from rights associated with the operation of an
ongoing concern (trademarks, trade names, going concern value,
goodwill).31 More broadly, and alternatively, it may mean any such
income, plus any income that cannot be definitively associated with
some other factor of production (labor, “tangible” capital, land, etc.).
The distinction is clouded by the inclusion of income from rights
associated with the ongoing concern of an enterprise in the narrow
category. But for our purposes, the distinction and its importance are
necessarily understood in the context of the role of (“global”) “intangible income” in the century-old regime of the “international tax
system” in general and transfer pricing in particular.
B.
The 1930s and the original “separate enterprise”
standard.
It is (by now) and oft-told if not hackneyed tale, but we begin
with the story of the emergence of the “international tax system” in
the 1920s.32 World War I witnessed the advent of high income and
31

In any event, when we talk about “intangible income” or “intangible property,” we exclude property and income which sometimes are (properly) described
as “intangible,” simply because they are not tangible, that is, property like securities, commercial paper, notes and other debt instruments, and the like.
32
For the original contemporary description of the tale, see H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19
COL. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359 (1981). The story is further elaborated in Stanley I.
Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 TAX NOTES
625, 625 (1986)
[hereinafter Myth]. For later (more reified) descriptions, see Michael J. Graetz &
Michael M. O’Hear, The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation, 46
DUKE L.J. 1021, 1022–28 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996);
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corporate income taxes in a wide range of jurisdictions, and in the
immediate postwar period, the International Chamber of Commerce
(“ICC”) and the businesses it represented sought measures to curtail
“double taxation”—i.e., the imposition of taxes on the same tax base
by two or more jurisdictions. The Financial Committee of the
League of Nations (“League”), at the urging of the ICC, took up the
problem. Early on, League materials articulated a concept of the
“economic allegiance” of income and a principle that taxing rights
should be assigned to the state to which the tax base in question—
income in the case of income taxes—owed primary “economic allegiance.”33
After eight years of work, the Committee devised certain “model
double taxation conventions” for adoption on a bilateral basis by
pairs of states. For the basic problem—taxation by one state on the
basis of residence or domicile of the taxpayer, and by the other on
the basis of the source or origin of the income—the principle
adopted by the League is called the “classification and assignment”
system: income is “classified” by category and then “assigned” to
either the “residence” or “source” state. Crudely expressed, as summarized by one contemporary commentator,34 this meant that “portfolio” income—from portfolio investment—was primarily to be assigned to the state of the taxpayer, while “direct investment” income—principally income from active business or real estate—was
Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX. L. REV.
259 (2003); Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 286–310. For views a bit at odds
with what appears to be the consensus description, see Michael P. Devereux &
John Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate Tax System Fit for the 21st
Century?, 35 FISCAL STUD. 449 (2014); Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income
Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Residence vs. Source, 5 COL. J. TAX LAW
1 (2013); cf. H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax System’, 53 TAX. L. REV. 137,
164 (2000).
33
League of Nations Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee Economic and Financial Commission, E.F.S.73.
F.19 (April 5, 1923), reprinted in 4 JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS (1961)
at 4003 [hereinafter Conventions Legislative History]; see also Langbein & Fuss,
supra note 7, at 286–94.
34
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996).
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assigned to the state of the “origin” of the income. These conventions also developed elementary “tie breaker” rules to address the
problems which arise when the two states both claim a right to tax a
taxpayer on the basis of the taxpayer’s domicile or residence.35
Left unaddressed was the question where two states might claim
to tax the same income because both claimed to be the source or
origin of the income. This involved primarily the income earned by
single enterprises operating across borders—the question of allocating the income of corporate groups. The League addressed this question in the early 1930s. Its work posited two basic approaches—a
“separate enterprise” approach or a “formula apportionment” approach. Under the former, the integrated enterprise was hypothesized to comprise a group of separate enterprises, and the tax base
allocated to each was determined by the profit that would be earned
by the hypothesized separate enterprises. Under the latter, the integrated profit of the enterprise was determined and then was to be
allocated on the basis of certain defined factors or benchmarks. The
work of the League favored the former; so the “separate enterprise”
standard was ultimately incorporated into the model conventions
and became the dominant standard in actual bilateral conventions
negotiated on the basis of the models.36
The 1930s work of the League recognized a significant difficulty
with the separate enterprise standard, however. This was that the total profits of the hypothesized separate enterprises might not sum to
the amount of the integrated profits—there might be a shortfall. This
recognition of a “residual” constitutes an early identification of
ideas now associated with “intangible income.” The sponsors of the
35

League of Nations, Double Taxation and Evasion Report Presented by the
General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion,
League of Nations Document C.562.M.178.1928.11 (Oct. 1928), reprinted in
Conventions Legislative History, supra note 33, at 4151–94.
36
The conclusions of the League work in this regard are set forth in Mitchell
Carroll, Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises (Volume IV) Methods of
Allocating Taxable Income, League of Nations Document No.
C.425(b).M.217(b).1933.11.A (Sept. 30, 1933) [hereinafter 1933 Carroll Report].
The work and recommendations of the Carroll report are set forth at Fiscal Committee — Report to the Council on the Work of the Committee — Fourth Session,
League of Nations Document No. C.399.M.204.1933.II (June 26, 1933) at 2, 3-7,
reprinted in Conventions Legislative History, supra note 33, at 4243-47; see generally Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 294–310.
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separate enterprise system suggested a solution to this difficulty: the
“residual” should be allocated, in full, to the country of the “home”
or “parent” enterprise of the group. The justification given for this
is that the managerial competence and strategic direction attributable to the parent enterprise was the true source of the “residual”
profit of the integrated group. In this light, the separate enterprise
standard was reconcilable with the “economic allegiance” principle:
the “allegiance” of the “residual” was to the situs of the parent enterprise.
C.

The 1968 U.S. regulations and the 1979 OECD Guidelines.
In the years ensuing after the 1930s, the polities of what we now
called the developed world became preoccupied with totalitarianism, of the left or right, and wars, hot and cold, and one consequence
was that the development of principles of tax comity generally, and
the allocation of the profits of multinational enterprises in particular,
were rendered secondary if not tertiary or quaternary concerns.
These preoccupations subsided after about a quarter century; by the
early 1960s, and, by then, tax authorities faced a greatly changed, if
perhaps surprisingly well-functioning, world economy. One feature
of this new world was the considerable expansion of multinational
enterprise, the vast majority of which were “based” in the United
States, i.e., the parent corporation was organized under the laws of
the United States or one of its constituent states.
In the 1960s, concerns about the efficiency and equity effects of
tax policy, in light of this expansion of United States-based enterprise, led the United States Administration to propose changes to the
statutory approach to taxing those enterprises.37 The most significant and durable part of this effort were its “transfer pricing” regulations, finalized in the latter part of the decade.38 Although these
regulations were faithful to the “separate enterprise” concept elaborated in the 1930s and embodied in model and bilateral conventions,
they took an approach slightly different from that of the earlier period. In the earlier period, each separate enterprise was evaluated to
37

See generally Myth, supra note 32, at 640–44; Langbein & Fuss, supra note
7, at 310–13.
38
Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers, 34 Fed. Reg.
5848 (Jan. 22, 1969); Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers,
33 Fed. Reg. 933 (Jan. 22, 1969).
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determine what share it would have had of the combined group
profit. In the new phase, profits were to be allocated by treating the
hypothesized separate enterprise and dealing with each other
through hypothesized intercompany transactions and determining a
transfer price—the price that would be charged between the two enterprises, conceived as separate, in the hypothetical intercompany
transaction.39
The regulations established rules for five categories of intercompany transactions—lending of money; performance of services by
one company for the benefit of the other; the leasing of tangible
property; the licensing or transfer of intangible property; and the
transfer of tangible property.40 The rules with respect to the fifth of
these categories—transfer of tangible property—were by far the
most significant. The new regulations introduced the concept of
“methods” of determining the “transfer price” and defined three
methods. The first was the “comparable uncontrolled price” method,
under which the price in a transaction between “uncontrolled” parties, i.e., parties not under common control, that was comparable to
the “controlled” transaction in question, and that price (subject to
adjustments) became the transfer price. The second was the “resale
price method,” to be used if no comparable uncontrolled transactions could be identified, under which a comparable “resale” transaction was identified, and the margin of the downstream party in
that transaction was used (again subject to adjustments) to determine
the transfer price in “controlled” transaction. The third method was

39

See Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 314–16.
This categorical schema remains in the regulations in force today; although
the structure is more opaque, the rules are greatly more complicated. The lending
rules, originally placed at Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a), remain with the same citation,
as do the rules governing the use of tangible property (the leasing rule), at Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-2(a). The services rules, originally placed at Treas. Reg. § 1.4822(b), remain there in small part, but the rules governing the methods used in services allocations are at Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9. The transfer of intangible property
rules, originally placed at Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d), are now Treas. Reg. § 1.4824, although the pre-1993 rules remain as Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d). Similarly, the
transfer of tangible property rules are now Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3, although the
pre-1993 rules remain as Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(e). The latter two provisions
(Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-3 and -4) are supplemented by Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-5 and
-6. governing, respectively, the comparable profits and profit split methods, which
were newly added in the 1990s.
40
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the “cost-plus” method, under which the downstream seller/producer’s costs were determined; a comparable “resale” transaction
was identified; and the markup of the downstream party in that transaction was used (again subject to adjustments) to determine the
transfer price in “controlled” transaction.41
This schema presents the root of the ambiguity in the concept of
“intangible income.” In the first place, the conception of the “transfer price” at least implicitly denied the reality or even the possibility
of a “residual”: the implication was that the transfer price, once determined, definitively allocated all of the income of the integrated
group. The regulations mitigated this hard stance in slight ways,
such as by providing for unspecified “fourth methods” if none of the
first three could be made workable.42 But this created the invitation,
if a residual showed up under analysis, to assume the residual was
allocable to some kind of “intangible property,” irrespective of
whether anything genuinely recognizable as “property” could be
identified. In the second place, the regulations were silent on how to
handle what is, evidently, the predominant form of economic “transfer” that takes place within an integrated multinational group, viz.
where there is a transfer of “tangible” property, where the value of
the property is attributable to technology or trade value “embedded”
in the tangible property transferred. This occurs, for instance, where
a pharmaceutical company transfers a product which embodies a patent or protected secret, or a soft drink producer transfer formula
embodying both a secret process and a license to market it under a
globally recognized trade name. The question was whether there
should be one transfer price determined in the situation, on the one
hand, or two or more, on the other. If the former, the determination
would be made under the tangible property transfer rules with the
presence of the intangible value treated as a factor in determining
whether “uncontrolled” transactions were comparable, or whether
adjustments needed to be made. If the latter, a determination would
41
These methods remain in the regulations, in modified form. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-3(b) (comparable uncontrolled price), (c) (resale price), (d) (cost-plus).
The pre-April 21, 1993 antecedents are at Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(e)(2)(3), and
(4) (pre-April 21, 1993).
42
See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(e)(1)(iii) (pre-April 21, 1993). The descendants of this curious rule survive in the regulations currently in force. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.482-3(e), 1.482-4(d) (“unspecified methods”).
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be made under the tangible property regulations as if the product
were simply the material transferred without regard to the effect either of special assembly or special branding; and separate determinations would be made with respect to each element of intangible
property “embedded” in the thing transferred. The silence of the regulations on this point would greatly aggravate the tendency to make
the determination under the first method, which would virtually
guarantee generating a “residual,” and then to assume the “residual”
was related to “intangible property,” without ever specifying what
the intangible property was.43
Whatever its apparent failings, over the decade following the introduction of these regulations, the United States Treasury and the
global business community succeeded in convincing virtually all affected parties—the tax authorities in both developed and developing
states; international organizations; and world trade bodies—that the
rules represented not only an appropriate but the only appropriate
application of the treaty-based “separate enterprise” rule.44 Rules reflecting those of the United States regulations were adopted by the
OECD in 1979 as the first version of the Guidelines.45 In the intervening time, however, there was one development of great importance not so much for its effect on the law as for its impact on
transfer pricing discussion internationally. As noted, in the 1930s,
the League work had begun by postulating two fundamental approaches to allocated cross-border income of integrated enterprises—a separate enterprise and a formula allocation approach.
43

The regulations promulgated in 1994 and in force today set forth provisions
to address this problem, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(e), which they do quite imperfectly.
44
Most influential in this regard was a 1971 report, summarizing individual
country reports, to the International Fiscal Association, reported by Professor
Stanley Surrey, who had been the Assistance Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy during the entire period of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration (196169), and his principal international tax assistant at Treasury (what is now the International Tax Counsel), David R. Tillinghast. Stanley Surrey & David Tillinghast, General Report, Criteria for the Allocation of Items of Income and Expense
Between Related Companies, 56b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONALE
I/1, I/12-13 (1971); see also Myth, supra note 32, at 646–51; Langbein & Fuss,
supra note 7, at 316–18.
45
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS (1979).
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And while the international community had adopted the former for
use among nations, the states of the United States adopted the latter
for use among themselves. With the expansion of international commerce in midcentury, the state governments in the United States expanded the use of this method to include the foreign income of the
enterprises in their allocation formulae. This triggered severe objection from the affected enterprises, and a broad coalition of foreign
business, domestic business, foreign governments, and the Federal
Treasury sought to prevent the states from using the formula methods, by treaty, Federal legislation, or court ruling. When all of these
failed, the matter was finally resolved by compromise in the mid1980s.46
But the upshot of what eventuated as a long and bitter dispute
was a lingering sense that “formula apportionment” was somehow
an illegal or off-color approach, and the “arm’s length” standard was
by contrast the “international norm.” This elevation of “arm’s
length” was ahistorical and misleading in two important respects.
First, as emphasized here, the original “separate enterprise” standard
involved hypothesizing the separate components of the enterprise as
independent and determining what their separate profit would be.
But the notion of doing so by constructing intercompany transfer
prices through hypothesized but “delineated” transactions was
largely the product of the latter day 1960s regulations. And the
“arm’s length” idea was slightly different from the “separate enterprise” standard in that the former involved hypothesizing that the
separate enterprises were dealing with each other at “arm’s length.”
Second, the course of development following the 1960s regulations involved some degree of departure from, if not, indeed, infidelity to, the underlying “economic allegiance” principle undergirding the entirety of the international system. As noted, in its original
form, the separate enterprise standard conceded the existence of a
“residual” and justified accordingly the right to tax it to the home or
parent state. That may or may not be a valid application of the economic allegiance principle, but at a minimum it concedes the importance of devising allocation rules that conform to that principle.
The consequence of the elevation of the “arm’s length” idea in this
46

On the controversy over the states’ use of formula apportionment, see
Myth, supra note 32, at 625–28 and sources there cited; Langbein & Fuss, supra
note 7, at 317.
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period, however, was not only to imply ignorance of the potential
for a “residual”; it elevated the “arm’s length standard” and its supposed status as an “international norm” to be the end in itself, irrespective of its consistency with the overarching principle of economic allegiance. This becomes an element of what I have elsewhere called “cognitive capture”47—called “soft capture” by
some48—where the idea takes hold which, though disputable or even
demonstrably perverse, begins to dominate policy irrespective of its
merits, and without continuing evaluation of either its merits or its
origins. It is the first instance of such we shall identify in this narrative; we shall discover others, and they have a significant effect on
international progress going forward.
II.

TRANSFER PRICING WARS AND “CONTRACTUAL TERMS”

A.

The 1986 tax reform.
The broad consensus about the “arm’s length” standard cracked
in the mid-1980s, at least in the United States. The United States had
embarked on a serious program of reducing tax rates in the early
1980s, which culminated in the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986,49 which greatly reduced both corporate and individual tax
rates in a “revenue neutral” statute that simultaneously enacted numerous measures broadening the tax base. The Congress considered
including transfer pricing reform among the base broadening
measures, but in the end refrained from doing so, although the Committee Reports on the statute set forth an explicit directive to the
Treasury to conduct a study of what the Congress recognized as the
serious deficiencies of existing transfer pricing law and practice.50
The Treasury completed this study in 1988 and plainly recognized
47

Stanley I. Langbein, Cognitive Capture, Parliamentary Parentheses, and
the Rise of Fractional Apportionment, 39 TAX MGM’T INT’L J. 567, 580–81
(2010); Willem H. Buiter, Central banks and financial crises, 104, 106 (Sept. 14,
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.willembuiter.com/hole.pdf (setting forth theory of “cognitive regulatory capture”).
48
Gangl et al, Coercive and legitimate authority impact tax honesty: evidence
from behavioral and ERP experiments, 7 Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neuroscience 1108–
17 (July 12, 2017).
49
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 109 Stat. 2089 (1986).
50
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841 at 11-638 (1986).
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the problem that the existing regulations did not determinately allocate the entire income of an integrated group.51 It relied on academic
literature making this point, literature sharply critical of the “arm’s
length standard” conceived as described above.52
Aggravating this circumstance were press reports about transfer
pricing abuses. The United States monopoly on housing multinational enterprise had long since dissolved, and by the mid-1980s, the
globe was populated by large and successful global enterprises
based in Europe and Japan, and even some whose home was in
emerging economies like South Korea, Taiwan, or Israel. These Japanese enterprises had become volume exporters of products such as
automobiles and electronic equipment to the United States. Press reports in the late 1980s revealed that some of these exports, particularly but not only the Japanese, were reporting and paying shockingly low rates of corporate income tax.
B.

The White Paper.
The Treasury’s 1988 “White Paper,” the report issued in response to the congressional directive, had suggested supplementing
the three “methods” of the 1960s regulations with two additional
ones. The first would have measured directly the profits of subsidiaries in a jurisdiction and compared it to those of “comparable” entities in that jurisdiction; the Paper called this the “basic arm’s length
return method.”53 The second would have determined the residual
and split on some unspecified basis; the paper called this the profit
split method.54 These methods would be used to generate a “transfer
price,” but it was apparent that such a price would have little if anything to do with any comparable transaction. These features of the
report triggered opposition in foreign countries, which found them
incompatible with an “arm’s length” principle which presupposed
constructing transfer prices on the basis of comparable transactions,
not comparable profits or comparable results. The Europeans called
the White Paper’s proposals “profits methods,” and contrasted them
with the three methods received from the 1960s, which they called
51

UNITED STATES TREASURY DEP’T, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING
182–83 (1988) was issued as Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
52
Id. at 122–24 citing Myth (discussing the “continuum price problem”).
53
Id. at 65.
54
Id. at 160–61.
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“transactional methods.” Oddly, the two sides were in some sense
in switched positions from the sides that had obtained the 1960s,
when the United States introduced in concrete form the approach of
constructing transactions and determining “transfer prices” from actual comparable prices: the White Paper suggestions harkened back
to the elementary ideas of the 1930s and 1940s, which seemed to
accept the process of determining the income that would be allocated to an enterprise independent of the group by examining the
enterprise’s operations in their entirety.
C.

Revised U.S. Regulations.
The United States published proposed regulations in early
1992,55 which implemented in part the White Paper proposals, and
these triggered concern and opposition in foreign business and official circles. The OECD convened a task force to comment on the
United States proposals and to formulate amendments to the 1979
Guidelines.56 Working behind the scenes with foreign powers, the
United States issued new temporary57 and proposed regulations in
1993;58 these would form the core of the new regime, both of the
revised United States regulations and the revised Guidelines.
These regulations, made final in 199459 and 1995,60 set forth the
two new “profit methods” derived, though greatly modified, from
the White Paper—the “ballroom method” now called the “comparable profits method,”61 and the profit split method divided into two
parts, a “comparable profit split” method and a “residual profit split”

55

INTL-372-88 INTL-401-88, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (Jan. 30, 1992).
See Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 323; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OCDE /GD(93)131,
Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under U.S. Section 482 Temporary
and Proposed Regulations, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(93)131&docLanguage=En.
57
TD 8470, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (Jan. 21, 1993).
58
58. Fed. Reg. 5310 (Jan. 21, 1993).
59
TD 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,971 (July 8, 1994).
60
TD 8632, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,553 (Dec. 19, 1995) superseded by TD 9568, 76
Fed. Reg. 80, 882 (Dec. 22, 2011).
61
The regulations governing this method, promulgated in 1994, remain in
force today as Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5.
56

22

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

method.62 But the key element of the new regulations was an articulate definition of the “comparability” of an uncontrolled transaction or entity to be determined irrespective of which of any of the
now five available methods was used.63 This definition set forth a
five factors to be examined in connection with determining when
transactions or entities were “comparable”: functional analysis;
“contractual terms”; risk; property; and economic conditions.64 Of
these, only one, the last, involved matters external to the parties examined; the others concerned the operations of the tested “controlled” groups and the external “comparable” group. The idea was
that one applied these factors to the group under examination (the
taxpayer), then found an external “uncontrolled” group, which,
when examined, most resembled the taxpayer group with respect to
the five factors. Then, theoretically, one used the “comparable
price” charged between the members of the external group (in the
case of the comparable uncontrolled price method), or the resellermargin (resale price method), producer markup (cost-plus), or profit
measure (comparable profits), or profit division (profit split), to determine the “transfer price” to be charged between the uncontrolled
parties in the taxpayer group.
Above we drew a distinction between the approach of the 1960s
regulations (and 1979 Guidelines), which cast the objective of examination as determining a “transfer price” under a series of prescribed methods; and that suggested by the earlier documents of the
1930s and 1940s, which viewed the effort as determining an allocation of profits, with the determination of a comparable price the only
pricing method, to be supplemented in the wide range of instances
in which it was contemplated that such a determination would not
be possible. An interesting feature of this third iteration of transfer
pricing rules is that it in ways combined the two approaches. It was
faithful to the “pricing” technique, on the surface, because the comparability examination was to serve in the selection of a benchmark
to be used in connection with a method, and the method ultimately
determined a “price.” But it resurrected the direct-allocation approach because the complex and articulate comparability analysis in
62

The regulations governing this method, promulgated in 1994, remain in
force today as Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6.
63
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6.
64
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d).
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itself reflected if it did not constitute such an approach. In particular,
the triple functional analysis/property/risk examination adumbrates
in a ghostly way the property/payroll/sales approach of the formula
apportionment method historically used by the American states;65
and once one thoroughly considered those features of a controlled
group operation, one could make an allocation on that basis, without
the need for replicating the analysis with respect to a “comparable”
group, and indeed without the importation of a price/margin/markup/profit indicator/profit split to determine a “price.”
This intuition proves to be prescient about what experience
would be under this transfer pricing drittes Reich. The setup of the
rules tended ineluctably to undermine the notion that the exercise
was to determine a “price” based on the use of “methods” and “comparables”; but rather to determine an allocation based on “functions,
assets, and risks,” a triad the OECD materials would repeat so steadily that a leading commentator would refer to the references as “jargon.”66 But, given this, there was one circumstance which undermined further the notion that the comparability determination would
be the result of an honest consideration of these three aspects of the
production process. For there was a fourth factor about the internal
operations of the controlled group which was given a prominent
place in the comparability determination and that was, of course,
contractual terms. Ostensibly, contractual terms were but an element
of the comparability determination: the idea was that one should find
an “uncontrolled” set of parties which set terms between the parties
that resembled or approximated the terms set forth between the controlled parties, often in their formal intercorporate agreements. But
the pattern suggested above—of the comparability determination

65

The parallel between “assets” and “property” is straightforward. That between “payroll” and “functions” is not exact, but functional operations, particularly if examined as distinct from assets and risks, would ordinarily implicate in
some proportional manner the volume of payroll. The link of “risks” to “sales” is
the most obscure of the three, but is clearer if one bears in mind that throughout
its discussions of risk, most particularly in the later stages of the BEPS report, see
part IV infra, the OECD tends to see risk not narrowly as the threat of loss, but
more expansively as a synonym for what might be called profit opportunity.
Hence risk in this sense might follow the volume of sales.
66
Richard J. Vann, Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled
Wonderland and the End of the World, 2 WORLD TAX J. 291, 326 (2010).
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degenerating into a direct allocation rather than a preliminary element of the determination of a “price”—operated as much with respect to this factor as it did with respect to the other three or four.
And two further, also foreseeable, tendencies operated to create
a highly problematic set of consequences. First, because “contractual terms” were concrete and visible, and functions/assets/risks
were nebulously defined and subject to innumerable ambiguities,
“contractual terms” came to be the dominant—and, in later years,
sometimes the sole—factor examined in connection with the “comparability” determination. Although neither the regulations nor the
Guidelines were entirely clear in mandating this, the “contractual
terms” criterion came to be both a presumption and a first step in the
comparability analysis: the intercorporate contract were the reference by which it was determined which functions, risks, and assets
were attributed to which component of the group. That task is exceedingly difficult in a group of nominally separate corporations
typically operating as a unit; but the terms of intercorporate contract
could be centrally controlled and made absolutely clear. Second, and
this was the vicious step in the process, although it clearly reinforced
the other steps, the elevation of “contractual terms” gave extraordinary discretion to the taxpayer itself to determine the outcome of the
whole process, and in particular, to determine the situs of the “residual” income.
This is in fact what occurred. And this meant that with the three
successive transfer pricing regimes, there were three distinguishable
approaches to the taxation of the “residual:” in the 1930s regime, the
contemplation was largely that the residual would be allocated to the
“home” jurisdiction of the parent of the group, on grounds that the
functioning of the headquarters was the source of the residual profit.
In the 1960s regime, the residual was indeterminately assigned; the
matter depending first on the selection of the “method” to be used,
but second on the discretion of the examining authority. But under
either of these regimes, the residual could still be taxed at source. In
the drittes Reich, the residual was to be taxed by whichever state
was selected by the taxpayer group. That was a formula for trouble.
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D.

Revised OECD Guidelines and “contractual terms.”
In 1995-96, the OECD issued its second (first revised) version
of its Guidelines.67 As the 1979 Guidelines had closely followed the
1968 United States rules, these revisions closely followed the 199394 United States rules, although the OECD’s demurrals to and departures from the United States predecessor were substantially
greater than any the organization had expressed seventeen years earlier.68 In particular, the Guidelines set forth a far more restricted role
for the comparable profits method, which the OECD calls the “transactional net profits method” (“TNPM”), than contemplated by the
United States regulations.69 But the OECD Guidelines adopted the
complex definition of comparability, accepted the five factors listed
in the United States regulations, and emphasized the role of “contractual terms.”70 This set the stage for what occurred.
This dominant role of “contractual terms” interacted with the
“methods” in a destructive way. It had been recognized long before
the promulgation of the revised regulations and Guidelines that what
I had called the “single-component” methods,71 what the OECD
now calls the “unilateral” or “one-sided” methods—the resale price
and cost-plus methods of the 1960s regime, joined by the comparable profits method of the new rules—were methods that did not definitively allocate the entire income of the group. After several applications of these methods to the various components of the group,
one would be left with the “residual.” If contractual terms determined the final allocation, and if the unilateral methods were permissible approaches, the “controlled” parties could devise contracts
which allocated only “marginal” income to both a state where property was “produced” (or services “performed”) or the state where
the property or services were “sold” or “distributed;” with the “re67

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
68
On these differences in detail, see Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 331–
36.
69
1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 67, ¶¶ 3.26-3.57.
70
Id. ¶¶ 1.15-1.35. The 1995 version did not include “risk” as one of the five
factors, but instead included “business strategies.” This was changed in the 2010
version of the Guidelines.
71
See Myth, supra note 32, at 628.
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sidual”—the lion’s share of the total group income—shifted, instead, to an interposed third “base country,” ordinarily a low-tax
“tax haven” with little economic connection to the income producing process.
The situation was aggravated further by the “developer-assister”
concept, born during the process of developing the 1960s regulations in the United States,72 carried over in both the final 1968 and
1994 regulations73 and in the OECD Guidelines in 1979 and 199596. Under this principle, one component of a group could be designated the “developer” of intangible property, with the others treated
as “assisters;” but no income was to be allocated to any of the “assisters” until and unless the intangible property in question was finally developed and placed in service. The rule obviously facilitated
the concentration of “residual” income in a central party organized
in a low-tax jurisdiction. Thus, the residual could be directed to a
low-tax jurisdiction.
And these opportunities were magnified by the confusion, articulated above, in ideas about “intangible income.” If it were assumed
that intangible income meant the residual, and that intangible income necessarily meant income attributable to identifiable intangible property, that conception facilitated the process by which multinational enterprises, particularly in industries like pharmaceuticals
or technology, could allocate by “contractual terms” the “residual”
to “tax havens.” Those enterprises would ordinarily possess valuable and identifiable intangible property, and they could by intercorporate contract assign “ownership” of this property to the tax haven
subsidiary. If the entire residual were assumed to be income from
“the intangible,” this would mean the entire residual was reposed in
the tax haven. A different situation obtained if the intangible property were conceived as a factor like any other, to be allocated a “marginal” return, and the “residual” were understood to be income attributable to the fact of organization itself and not to any particular
income producing factor.74

72

The rule appears, as applicable to pre-April 21, 1993 transactions, at Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-2A(d)(1)(ii).
73
The rule is reflected in the rule of the present regulations governing ownership of intangibles. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3).
74
See Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 320–21.
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Ultimately, however, this practice meant that the actual operation of the rules devised in the 1990s made a mockery of the supposedly overarching principles of “independent enterprise” dealing
at “arm’s length.” If the independent enterprise were a producing/performing arm, on the one hand, and a distributing/purchasing
arm, on the other, and their joint operation produced a sizable “residual” profit, it would seem the last thing they would do would be
to seek out an “independent” third party intermediary to which they
would shift, and in which they would accumulate, the major part of
their jointly profitable operations.
In any event, this structure was increasingly used to shield corporate income, especially in technology-intensive industries, from
taxation on the basis of source in any country other than its parent
country. This was phenomena responsible for the large accumulations of cash in foreign countries, particularly low-tax countries,
witnessed in the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. These
accumulations were in turn largely responsible for the intense pressure by the multinational community to enact “territoriality” and
“repatriation,” both of which were enacted by the TCJA. When these
large accumulations are repatriated under those provisions at reduced rates of tax, they will be returned having been barely taxed by
any country at all, although any number of nations may have had a
claim to tax it. The situation attracted the attention of the OECD
very soon after the revisions of the 1990s were finalized. Over time,
the OECD became increasingly concerned about the situation. The
United States did not.
III.

LE CÐTE OCDE

A.

Permanent establishments.
The OECD Model Convention, like all of its predecessors since
the 1930s, has two provisions premised on the “independent enterprise” standard. Article 9 governs relations established between “associated enterprises.”75 This applies where an enterprise of one contracting state operates in the other through a separately formed or
75

Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, MODEL
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL, art. 9
(2010).
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incorporated enterprise. Article 7 governs relations between an enterprise of one contracting state and a permanent establishment
(“PE”) situated in the other.76 This governs where the enterprise in
the first contracting state operates in the other, but does not do so
through a separately incorporated entity, but rather through a branch
of the home state entity. The latter form of doing cross-border business is most common in the banking industry, and some other financial service businesses, but far less common outside the financial
sector.
The original work in the 1930s did not distinguish too sharply
between the two contexts. As noted, it was based on primary reliance on “comparable uncontrolled prices,” backed up by allocation
methods, as opposed to pricing methods, and contemplated this approach both with respect to the associated enterprise and PE contexts. The expansion of multinational corporate activity in the period
following World War II was effected primarily through the formation by “home” countries of separate legal entities in “host”
states. Reflecting this, the United States regulations were effected
under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which confers authority on the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate income among
separate enterprises under common control. It does not concern
cross-border branching, which is governed largely by the rules governing source of income and allocation of deductions, both with respect to “outbound” branch operations (foreign branches of United
States persons) and the “inbound” (United States branches of foreign concerns).
Because the 1979 OECD Guidelines so closely followed the lead
of the United States, those Guidelines were concerned primarily
with the Article 9 “associated enterprises” context. This pattern held
in the early 1990s when the United States reformulated its regulations, and the OECD reformed its approach, for the most part accordingly. Thus, the Article 7 context was not governed by the transfer pricing concepts which by the end of the century had become
well entrenched, notwithstanding that identical treaty language governed both contexts.

76

Id. at art. 7.
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B.

The AOA.
Early after the turn of the century, this changed, as the OECD
established elaborate principles to govern the Article 7 context,
based roughly, but with critically significant differences, on the
Transfer Pricing Guidelines.77 These principles were embodied in
what the OECD called the “authorized OECD approach,” or AOA,
finalized in 2010. The interlude in which these principles evolved is
important for our purposes for three major reasons. First, the development of these rules represented the first occasion on which the
OECD took the initiative without any prodding from the United
States, and which it developed principles that were not based on previous United States rules (and which the United States would not
follow even after those principles were finalized). Second, the substance of the OECD’s approach reflected very clearly that throughout the OECD was aware of and concerned about the “degeneration”
of the 1995-96 transfer pricing rules. And it is significant that the
OECD’s consciousness of the problem long predated the press reports, European Union actions, and hearings in the United States
Congress that would highlight the difficulties and lead ultimately to
BEPS. Third, certain particular facets of the final approach adopted
by the OECD form the basis of principles the OECD would apply in
the transfer pricing context, first in the revision of the Guidelines in
2010, and later in the revision in 2015-17 developed in connection
with the BEPS initiative. The latter two matters need detain us but a
bit.
At the outset of its AOA project, the OECD made clear it would
not be bound by, to use Brett Kavanaugh’s oft-repeated if mildly
unctuous phrase, “history, tradition, and precedent”: the Justice’s
project was not to be “constrained” by “the original intent or the
historical practice and interpretation of Article 7”; instead “the focus
was on formulating the most preferable approach . . . given modern77

The OECD’s development of these rules began with a Discussion Draft
published in 2001, although its internal consideration of the matter had begun
somewhat earlier. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS (2001), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/1923028.pdf. The various drafts of the final version of the report are cited,
and the progress of the project reviewed in detail, in Langbein & Fuss, supra note
7, at 341–50.
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day multinational operations and trade.”78 But in stepping out from
the past, the AOA’s most critical step was in rejecting the use of
“contractual terms” or any analogue of it in the PE context. The
OECD’s stated reason for this departure from the Guidelines was
that, among associated enterprises, “the determination of which enterprise owns assets and which bears risk is determined by legally
binding contracts or other ascertainable legal arrangements . . .
providing those contracts or legal arrangement reflect the underlying reality and meet the criteria in Chapter I of the Guidelines,”
while “[t]he factual, legal position in a PE context . . . is that there
is no single part of an enterprise which legally ‘owns’ the assets,
assume the risks, possesses the capital or contracts with separate enterprises.” But since “Article 7(2) requires the PE to be treated as if
it were a distinct and separate enterprise, performing its own functions, assuming its own risk, and owning or using assets on its own,”
it was “necessary under the arm’s length principle of Article 7 to
develop a mechanism for attributing risks, economic ownership of
assets [footnote omitted] and capital to the hypothetically distinct
and separate PE the rights and obligations arising out of transactions
between separate enterprises and the enterprise of which the PE is a
part and for recognising and determining the nature of the dealings
(i.e., the intra-enterprise equivalents of separate enterprise transactions) between the hypothetically distinct and separate PE and other
parts of the enterprise of which the PE is a part.”79
Two salient points may be made. First, this passage comes closer
than anything in the Guidelines or the United States regulations to
conceding what the actual role of “contractual terms” had become:
as both a presumption about the ultimate profit allocation, and a
first—and near determinative—step in the course of the functional
or “comparability” analysis that was purportedly to follow. Second,
the passage exhibits without expressing concern by the OECD with
where practice under the 1993-96 innovations was heading. As a
colleague and I have noted elsewhere, this passage both overstates
the difference between the associated enterprise and PE contexts and

78

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2010
REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS, ¶ 3,
at 11 (July 22, 2010).
79
Id. ¶ 17, at 13–14.
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unduly deprecates the feasibility of employing an analogue to “contractual terms” in the latter context.80 As to the first point, intercorporate contracts in a commonly controlled group are really enforced
only where one or more of the controlled parties is dealing with an
uncontrolled party; the identification of “functions, risks, assets”
with particular component enterprises can be no less challenging
where the components of an enterprise are legally separate as opposed to where they are not. Nor is there any reason to be sanguine
or complacent about the task of determining whether “contracts”
comport with “underlying reality,” the “actual conduct” of the parties, or the criteria of Chapter I. As to the second, most enterprises
operating through branches keep separate books and accounts for
separate branches—often they are required to do so—and there is
little reason why these accounts could not be used as a starting point
in siting “functions, assets, risks” among various components of an
enterprise. This technique is precisely that used in certain U.S.
Treasury regulations governing foreign banks with U.S. branches.
For these reasons, the conclusion is ineluctable that a principal
motivation for the limitation of any taxpayer-determined starting
point in the PE context was the organization’s emerging consciousness of where the use of that technique under the Guidelines was
tending—and a determination to staunch the spread of problematical
practices and results.
The second point concerns what the AOA devises as a substitute
for “contractual terms” in localizing “functions, assets, risks.” Given
that it was “not possible to use a legal analysis as the required mechanism, another solution must be sought,” and the AOA found this in
an analysis of “people functions:” the AOA “attributes to the PE
those risks for which the significant functions relevant to the assumption and/or management (subsequent to the transfer) or risks
are performed by people in the PE and also attributes to the PE economic ownership of assets for which the significant functions relevant to the economic ownership of assets are performed by people
in the PE.”81 The Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments says that “the significant people functions relevant
to the assumption of risks are those which involve active decision
80

Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 345–46.
2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra note 78, ¶ 18, at 14 (footnote omitted).
81
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making.” Under this formulation, risk reposed where it was managed, irrespective of where it posed a risk of loss. Thus, capital followed risk, not vice versa: “the part of the enterprise that performs
the significant people functions relevant to the assumption of
risks . . . would be attributed the capital necessary to support those
risks.”82
This association of risk with the place where it is managed—
later “controlled”—would be revisited by the OECD subsequently,
particularly in the final BEPS reports (and, thus, the 2015-2017 revisions of the Guidelines). The relationship of the place of management or control to the place whose capital might be jeopardized by
a risk would have to be refined, if not changed, by later work.
C.

The Restructuring Report (Guidelines Chapter IX).
Midway through the period when the AOA was evolving, the
OECD made a more frontal assault on the “contractual terms” regime, without suggesting any change in the provisions of the Guidelines that fostered that regime. Instead of attacking directly the role
of contractual terms in routing income to “central” subsidiary “developers,” the OECD chose instead to limit such allocations by devising new rules aimed at the transactions by which such parties
became central. And, in contrast to its performance in the AOA documents, the organization did not entirely conceal dissatisfaction
with existing and emerging practices. Early in the process of devising the restructuring rules, the OECD conceded it had discerned
“since the mid-90s” a “common pattern” of international business
organization, without regard to the industry sector, becoming “more
centralized,” with intangible assets and risks which had been “previously integrated in local operations” transferred to “more centralized and specialized regional or global units,” with revenue authorities “seeing reduced profits being generated in their jurisdictions as
a result.”83 The OECD conceded that there existed “no legal or universally accepted definition of business restructuring,” but offered
for working purposes the definition as “the cross-border redeployment by a multinational enterprise of functions, assets and/or risks,”
82
83

Id. ¶ 29.
ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2D
ANNUAL CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ROUNDTABLE: BUSINESS
RESTRUCTURING (Jan. 26-27, 2005).
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which “may involve cross-border transfers of valuable intangibles,”
and which consisted primarily of “internal reallocation of functions,
assets and risks within an MNE, although relationships with third
parties . . . may also be a reason for the restructuring and/or be affected by it.”84
In a 2008 Discussion Draft, the OECD identified four issues
with restructuring for consideration:
The question of the allocation of risks among commonly
controlled entities, with particular reference to the allocation between central and satellite parties, post-restructuring;
The determination of compensation to a transferring entity
in connection with the restructuring itself;
The allocation of profits post-restructuring, with particular
emphasis on the allocation of profits to the entities transferring assets or other “profit potential” in the restructuring; and
The occasion for allocation of profits post-restructuring in
derogation or disregard of “contractual terms.”85
The 2008 Discussion Draft set forth Issue Notes with respect to
each of the four, and in each case introduced novel concepts, all of
which curtailed the domain of “contractual terms,” in each case.
Only the innovations suggested with respect to the first two issues
survived, however, in the final 2010 version of the restructuring report; the terms of which were adopted as Chapter IX of the revised
2010 version of the Guidelines.
With respect to the first issue, the Discussion Draft provided that
the assignment of risks effected by “contractual terms” would not
be respected unless the assignment had “economic substance,” and
that the allocation would not be treated as having economic substance unless three conditions are met: the conduct of the parties
conforms to the “contractual terms”; the terms themselves are
“arm’s length”; and the consequences of the allocation were also
arm’s length. The second is the most significant, because the Draft
and 2010 Guidelines provide that in determining whether the terms
84
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF BUSINESS RESTRUCTURINGS: DISCUSSION DRAFT
1, 6 (Sept. 19, 2008-Feb. 19, 2009),
FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/41346644.pdf [hereinafter 2008 OECD
Restructuring Discussion Draft].
85
Id. at 3.
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are “arm’s length,” one must find a comparable uncontrolled group
if possible, and that, if not possible, one must determine whether the
allocation is one which hypothetical comparable parties would affect. It provided further that in making the latter determination, certain factors could “assist,” and the predominant factors were the allocation of “control over risk” and whether a party allocated such
control had the “financial capacity to assume the risk.”86
It then defined “control over risk” in terms suggested by the
AOA: “the capacity to make decision to take on the risk (decision to
put the capital at risk) and decisions on whether and how to manage
the risk, internally or using an external provider,” which would “require the company to have people—employees or directors—who
have the authority to, and effectively do, perform these control functions.” At the same time, the report cautioned that the “reference to
‘control over risk’ and of ‘financial capacity to assume the risk/ is
not intended to set a standard under Article . . . whereby risks would
always follow capital or people functions,” because “[t]he analytical
framework under Article 9 is different from the AOA that was developed under Article 7.”87
Nevertheless, these provisions did arm tax authorities to make
reallocations in derogation of “contractual terms” in circumstances
where a naked or “paper” transfer of ownership or other profit potential without change in the assignment of personnel or capital.
With respect to the second issue, the restructuring report, and
Chapter IX embodying it, recognized, if implicitly, the definitional
ambiguity with respect to the idea of “intangible income” noted at
the outset here. It provided for a compensatory payment to the transferring entity with respect to any transfer of profit potential from the
previous “full scale distributorship” to the transferee central party
without regard to whether the status of what was transferred as
“property” or the accounting treatment of the transfer. Thus, what
was transferred or lost in the restructuring might be a loss of local
synergies; an indemnification for a loss of contractual relationship,
irrespective of any enhancement of group-wide synergies; a loss of

86

Id. at 240–42; see Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 353–54.
2008 OECD Restructuring Discussion Draft, supra note 84, at 243–44; see
Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 354–55.
87
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profit potential which was not an asset; a transfer of goodwill; or a
going concern value.88
With respect to the final two issues, fairly extensive innovations
suggested by the 2008 Issues Notes were not carried forward into
the Guidelines. The third Issues Note discussed restrictions on the
role of “unilateral” or “one-sided” methods (RSP, CPM, TNMM) in
making post-restructuring determinations, and an elevation of the
role of the profit split method, to preserve some allocation to the
transferor entity.89 The fourth discussed broadened circumstances
for the “nonrecognition” of “contractual terms.”90
D.

The Intangibles Project.
Early in the process of producing the restructuring report, the
two working parties involved agreed that the issue of the ownership
of “intangibles” and the location of such ownership within a multinational group, would be excised from consideration in connection
with the restructuring report, especially from the second issue (compensation of the transferor party in a restructuring). The OECD,
upon the promulgation of 2010 Guidelines, announced it would take
up this issue in a third effort, a project to determine the role of “intangibles” in transfer pricing generally.91 The OECD pursued this
effort to the point of issuing a Discussion Draft in 2012.92 It did not
go beyond the Discussion Draft, however, because the project was
absorbed by the more general BEPS effort.

88
2008 OECD Restructuring Discussion Draft, supra note 84, at 21–27; see
Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 356–57.
89
2008 OECD Restructuring Discussion Draft, supra note 84, at 39–40; see
Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 357–58.
90
2008 OECD Restructuring Discussion Draft, supra note 84, at 52–54; see
Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 359–60.
91
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFER PRICING AND INTANGIBLES: SCOPE OF THE PROJECT, ¶ 1,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/46987988.pdf.
92
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
DISCUSSION DRAFT, REVISION OF THE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTANGIBLES

IN CHAPTER VI OF THE OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES AND RELATED
PROVISIONS (6 June to 14 Sept. 2012), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pric-

ing/50526258.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Intangibles Discussion Draft].
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In the Discussion Draft, Working Party No. 6 implicitly rejected
the “developer/assister” notion and established a conception of “intangible related returns,” saying that the Party’s delegates were “uniformly of the view that transfer pricing outcomes in cases involving
intangibles should reflect the functions performed, assets used, and
risks assumed by the parties,” and that that “neither legal ownership,
nor the bearing of costs related to intangible development, taken
separately or together, entitles an entity within an MNE group to
retain the benefits or returns with respect to intangibles without
more.”93
The Discussion Draft made clear that, in contrast to the developer/assister notion, there can be more than one “developer.” The
Draft deprecated “contractual terms” as it repudiated “developer/assister.” The Draft would not have assigned “economic ownership”
of an intangible but rather the right to participate in the IRRs, which
would generally follow from FAR analysis. The FAR analysis, in
turn, would ask “whether services rendered . . . by other members of
the MNE group to the member/s of the MNE group entitled to intangible related returns under the relevant registrations and contracts, are compensated on an arm’s length basis.”94 The 2012 Discussion Draft framed the test whether contractual agreements evince
the necessary economic “substance” to be respected, in terms suggested by Part II of the restructuring chapter, directing evaluation of
“the alignment between a contractual claim to entitlement to all or
part of the intangible related returns . . . and the conduct of the parties,” by examining functions, risks, and costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles. It emphasized that “[w]here the conduct of the parties is not
aligned with the terms of legal registrations and contracts, it may be
appropriate to allocate all or part of the intangible related returns to
the entity or entities that, as a matter of substance, perform the functions, bear the risks, and bear the costs that relate to development,
enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles.”95
The language about the “development, enhancement, maintenance and protection,” joined later by the term “exploitation” and

93
94
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Id. at 12.
See id. ¶ 29.
See id. ¶ 37.
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often acronymized as (“DEMPE,”) would become an important element of the “jargon” of the BEPS report.
IV.

BEPS

A.

The BEPS Project and Actions 8-10.
When Congress in 1985-86 gave impetus to transfer pricing reform,96 the initial signs, manifest in the Treasury’s 1988 White Paper,97 were that the system would be reformed to be more predictable and to restrict opportunities for abuse and tax avoidance. But
what resulted in the mid-1990s was a new system, which if anything,
gave greater room for abuse and avoidance.98 Similarly, when the
OECD initiated the restructuring effort in 2005, its initial document
exhibited a considerably greater degree of rationality and understanding of the economics of the operations of MNEs than did the
unreconstructed existing system.99 But that reformist rationality was
greatly dimmed—though not altogether extinguished—by the ultimate changes to the governing Guidelines finally adopted. A similar
pattern—initial promise, snuffed out by a more corporatist policy
tilt—would be repeated by the BEPS initiative.
The BEPS initiative was adopted by the G-20 in late 2012 and
entrusted to the OECD as the entity with the expertise to implement
the goals of the BEPS initiative. The OECD began its work with a
preliminary report issued in February 2013.100 This document articulated a “value creation paradigm.” The report stressed “a growing
perception that governments lose substantial corporate tax revenue
96
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986) (Conference
Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
97
UNITED STATES TREASURY DEP’T, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING
(1988) was issued as Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 182-83.
98
See generally discussion supra Part III.
99
The OECD called it a “lively dialogue” on “accelerating changes taking
place.” ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2ND
ANNUAL CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ROUNDTABLE:
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/2ndannualcentrefortaxpolicyandadministrationroundtablebusinessrestructuring.htm
[hereinafter 2005 Roundtable]; see Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 350–61.
100
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ADDRESSING
BASE
EROSION
AND
PROFIT
SHIFTING
(2013),
http://www.fiscooggi.it/files/addressing_base_erosion_and_profit_shifting.pdf.
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because of planning aimed at shifting away profits in ways that
erode the taxable base to locations where they are subject to a more
favorable tax treatment,”101 and focused upon the use of passive
entities to channel foreign direct investments so that profits on
those investments technically accrued to entities in low-tax jurisdictions, leading to “increased segregation between the location where
actual business activities and investment take place and the location
where profits are reported for tax purposes.”102
The report expressed dissatisfaction with the existing international tax order and eschewed the conventional vocal reaffirmation
of “arm’s length,” suggesting that “current rules provide opportunities to associate more profits with legal constructs and intangible
rights and obligations, and to legally shift risk intra-group, with the
result of reducing the share of profits associated with substantive
operations.”103 It identified the “underlying assumptions of the
arm’s length standard”104 as the cause of such “profit shifting” and
explicitly found it problematic to base the determination of transfer
prices on “contractual allocation of risks and intangibles.”105 The report identified “key pressure areas” and announced the intention to
develop a “comprehensive action” plan with the “main purpose”106
of providing instruments for governments to use in “better aligning
rights to tax with real economic activity”107 (i.e., “elements such
as sales, workforce, payroll, and fixed assets”), and which would
“realign international standards with current global business environment.”108
The report further states that achieving the goal of “better aligning rights to tax with real economic activity” and “realign[ing] international standards with [the] current global business environment” required revisiting “some of the fundamentals of the existing
standards” and that “incremental approaches may help curb the current trends but will not respond to several of the challenges.”109
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
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Specifically in the realm of transfer pricing, the report calls for
“improvements or clarifications” – without pledging allegiance to
the arm’s length standard – in order to address “areas where current
rules produce undesirable results from a policy perspective,”110 and
also asks that the on-going discussions on intangibles be “included
in a broader reflection on transfer pricing.”111
The second step in the BEPS process was the articulation of an
Action Plan, set out in a document issued three months later.112 This
document continued to express reservations about “arm’s length,”
but exhibited considerably greater coldness than had the earlier document toward fundamental reform. The Action Plan averred that the
arm’s length standard in “many instances” allocates the income of
MNEs “effectively and efficiently,” but conceded that the standard
could be “used and/or misapplied” in a way that results in “separat[ing] income from economic activity that produce that income.”113 But the Action Plan emphasized that “the importance of
concerted action and the practical difficulties associated with agreeing to and implementing the details of a new system” would compel
countries to refrain from “seeking to replace the current transfer
pricing system” and that “the best course is to directly address the
flaws in the current system, in particular with respect to returns related to intangible assets, risk and over-capitalisation.”114 Action
Points 8-10115 thus set as its objectives to “assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation,” which meant that
“profits associated with the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with (rather than divorced from)
value creation,”116 and to “ensure that inappropriate returns will not
accrue to an entity solely because it has contractually assumed risks
or has provided capital.”117
The third step in the process entailed the issuance of preliminary
deliverables or discussion drafts in 2014 and 2015. The fourth was
110

Id. at 5, 73.
Id. at 10, 52.
112
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ACTION PLAN ON BEPS (2013) [hereinafter OECD 2013 Action Plan].
113
Id.
114
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
115
The text of these Action Points is set forth in the Appendix to the article.
116
OECD 2013 Action Plan, supra note 112, at 20, Action 8.
117
Id. at 20, Action 9.
111
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the incorporation of the ideas set forth in the preliminary documents
into Final Documents. In the case of actions 8-10 of the Action Plan,
which concerned transfer pricing, the Final Reports were issued as
a single document and most of the provisions of that document were
to be adopted as amendments or additions to the Transfer Pricing
Guidance. The two final steps continued the progression established
by the first two: the preliminary deliverables/documents hewed
closely to the established dogma, with some innovations pointing
toward a reformed system, although even those innovations had
largely been visited previously, in the 2008 and 2010 documents
concerning restructuring, and the 2012 Discussion Draft on intangibles; the final reports blurred and minimized even this new movement reflected in the preliminary deliverables and drafts.
B.

The 2014 deliverables and discussion drafts.
The preliminary documents were issued serially according to
different topics, with seven pertaining to Actions 8-10 issued in all;
the provisions of most of these were modified and combined in the
single “Final Reports.” Of the seven preliminary reports, two were
of central significance: (1) a “deliverable” concerning intangible
property, issued pursuant to Action 8 in September 2014;118 and (2)
a Discussion Draft concerning risk, recharacterization, and special
measures, issued pursuant to Action 10 in December 2014.119 More
narrowly focused reports concerned low value-adding intra-group

118

Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ,
OECD/G20 BEPS Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, Gᴜɪᴅᴀɴᴄᴇ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Asᴘᴇᴄᴛs ᴏғ
Iɴᴛᴀɴɢɪʙʟᴇs, Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 8: 2014 Dᴇʟɪᴠᴇʀᴀʙʟᴇ (2014), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/guidance-on-transfer-pricing-aspects-ofintangibles_9789264219212-en#.WQOiXoWcGUk [hereinafter 2014 Action 8
Deliverable].
119
Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ, BEPS Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴs 8, 9, 10: Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ ᴏɴ Rᴇᴠɪsɪᴏɴs ᴛᴏ
Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ 1 ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Gᴜɪᴅᴇʟɪɴᴇs (Iɴᴄʟᴜᴅɪɴɢ Rɪsᴋ,
Rᴇᴄʜᴀʀᴀᴄᴛᴇʀɪsᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, ᴀɴᴅ Sᴘᴇᴄɪᴀʟ Mᴇᴀsᴜʀᴇs): 1 Dᴇᴄ. 2014 – 6 Fᴇʙ. 2015 (2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-actions-8-9-10-chapter-1-TP-Guidelines-risk-recharacterisation-special-measures.pdf
[hereinafter
2014 Recharacterisation Discussion Draft].
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services (November 2014);120 profit splits (December 2014)121
cross-border commodity transactions (December 2014);122 cost contribution agreements (“CCAs”) (April 2015);123 and hard-to-value
intangibles (June 2015).124 The Final Reports, covered all six topics
except the final guidance on profit splits, were issued as a single
document in September 2015.125
The most significant issues were addressed in the two principal
preliminary documents concerning intangibles and risk recharacterization. The intangibles deliverable was published about three
months before (September 2014) the recharacterization discussion
draft (December 2014). Nevertheless, it is better to begin our discussion with the latter matter, for two reasons. First, although the
120

Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ, BEPS ᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 10: Pʀᴏᴘᴏsᴇᴅ Mᴏᴅɪғɪᴄᴀᴛɪᴏɴs ᴛᴏ Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ VII ᴏғ
ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Gᴜɪᴅᴇʟɪɴᴇs Rᴇʟᴀᴛɪɴɢ ᴛᴏ Lᴏᴡ-Vᴀʟᴜᴇ-Aᴅᴅɪɴɢ Iɴᴛʀᴀ-Gʀᴏᴜᴘ
Sᴇʀᴠɪᴄᴇs:
3
Nᴏᴠᴇᴍʙᴇʀ
2014
14
Jᴀɴᴜᴀʀʏ
2015
(2015),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-action-10-low-valueadding-intra-group-services.pdf.
121
Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ, BEPS Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 10: Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Usᴇ ᴏғ Pʀᴏғɪᴛ
Sᴘʟɪᴛs ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Cᴏɴᴛᴇxᴛ ᴏғ Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Vᴀʟᴜᴇ Cʜᴀɪɴs: 16 Dᴇᴄᴇᴍʙᴇʀ 2014 - 6 Fᴇʙʀᴜᴀʀʏ
2015 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-action10-profit-splits-global-value-chains.pdf.
122
Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ, BEPS ᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 10: Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ
Asᴘᴇᴄᴛs ᴏғ Cʀᴏss-Bᴏʀᴅᴇʀ Cᴏᴍᴍᴏᴅɪᴛʏ Tʀᴀɴsᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴs: 10 Fᴇʙʀᴜᴀʀʏ 2015 (2015),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/public-comments-action-10-cross-border-commodity-transactions.pdf.
123
Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ, BEPS Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 8: Rᴇᴠɪsɪᴏɴs ᴛᴏ Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ VIII ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ
Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Gᴜɪᴅᴇʟɪɴᴇs ᴏɴ Cᴏsᴛ Cᴏɴᴛʀɪʙᴜᴛɪᴏɴs Aɢʀᴇᴇᴍᴇɴᴛs (CCAs): 29 Aᴘʀɪʟ 2015
- 29 Mᴀʏ 2015 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/discussion-draftBEPS-action-8-cost-contribution-arrangements.pdf.
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Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ, BEPS Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 8: Hᴀʀᴅ-ᴛᴏ-Vᴀʟᴜᴇ Iɴᴛᴀɴɢɪʙʟᴇs: 4 Jᴜɴᴇ 2015 18 Jᴜɴᴇ 2016 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-draftbeps-action-8-hard-to-value-intangibles.pdf [hereinafter 2015 HTVI Discussion
Draft].
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Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ,
OECD/G20 BEPS Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ: Aʟɪɢɴɪɴɢ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Oᴜᴛᴄᴏᴍᴇs ᴡɪᴛʜ Vᴀʟᴜᴇ
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Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛs
(2015),
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/aligningtransfer-pricing-outcomes-with-value-creation-actions-8-10-2015-final-reports_9789264241244-en#.WQOgdYWcGUk.
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intangibles preliminary document was published first, both documents resume the development of ideas published in earlier OECD
efforts—the 2010 restructuring report and Chapter IX of the 2010
Guidelines in the case of the recharacterization effort; the 2012 intangibles report in the case of the intangibles deliverable. Our discussion follows the order in which these earlier efforts appeared.
Second, the changes made in the Final Reports with respect to both
issues center around changes made directly to the provisions of the
risk/recharacterization Discussion Draft.
The 2014 recharacterization discussion draft made inroads on
“contractual terms” in three principal ways.126 The draft proposed a
complete restatement of Section D of Part I of the Guidelines, the
section that details the “comparability factors.” But the revision, in
line with the first major issue in the restructuring report and Chapter
IX, identified two “key aspects” of such an analysis: (1) “to identify
the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises and the conditions attaching to those relations in order that the
controlled transaction is accurately delineated”; and (2) “to compare
the conditions of the controlled transactions with the conditions of
comparable transactions between independent enterprises.”127 By
making the “delineation” two-step and emphasizing the role of the
second, the Discussion Draft undermines the degeneration of the entire comparability analysis into an examination of “contractual
terms”: the terms must have standing as “comparable” to some uncontrolled group situation. And, as Chapter IX provides, if no actual
external comparable is identifiable, the conformity must be to a hypothetical conception of what are or would be market terms.
The 2014 recharacterization draft also strengthened, to a considerable extent, language authorizing or directing tax administrations
to displace or override the contractual terms, where “the facts and
circumstances surrounding how those enterprises interact with one
another in their economic and commercial context” warrant that
“written contractual terms” be “clarified, or supplemented” by “the
actual commercial or financial relations”; where the terms were not
“reflected in the actual conduct of the parties,” or did “not reflect a
complete picture of the transactions” or had “been incorrectly characterised or labelled by the taxpayer,” or were “a sham”; or where
126
127

See Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 371–73.
2014 Recharacterisation Discussion Draft, supra note 119, ¶ 1.
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the “actual outcome of commercial or financial relations may not
have been identified as a transaction by the taxpayer, but nevertheless may result in a transfer of value.”128 In any of such cases, the
terms of the transactions “would need to be deduced from the conduct of the parties.”129
The second manner in which the Discussion Draft limited “contractual terms” concerned its provisions governing “risk.” The Draft
imported the two-part definition of Chapter IX of “control of risk.”
In the 2008/2010 business restructuring reports, the OECD had elaborated notions of “risk” and “control of risk”: the “capacity to make
decisions to take on the risk (decision to put the capital at risk); decisions on whether and how to manage the risk”; and the anticipated
“financial capacity to bear the full consequences of the risk.” 130
The third manner in which the Discussion Draft would have
tightened the transfer pricing rules was its provisions on “non-recognition” of intercorporate transactions.131 Nonrecognition depends
upon “[t]he concept of the fundamental economic attributes of arrangements between unrelated parties,” and “the test of commercial
rationality,” which “requires consideration of whether the actual arrangements differ from those which would have been adopted by
independent parties behaving in a commercially rational manner.”132
If an “actual arrangement, viewed in its entirety, would not afford
such an opportunity to each of the parties, or would afford it to only
one of them,” the transaction is not recognized.133 If the transaction
is not recognized, then the taxpayer’s “structure” should be replaced
by a structure “determined by the alternative transaction that affords
the parties the opportunity to enhance or protect their commercial or
128
Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ: BEPS Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴs 8, 9 ᴀɴᴅ 10: Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ ᴏɴ Rᴇᴠɪsɪᴏɴs
ᴛᴏ Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ I ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Gᴜɪᴅᴇʟɪɴᴇs (ɪɴᴄʟᴜᴅɪɴɢ Rɪsᴋ,
Rᴇᴄʜᴀʀᴀᴄᴛᴇʀɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, ᴀɴᴅ Sᴘᴇᴄɪᴀʟ Mᴇᴀsᴜʀᴇs), ¶¶ 2–5, 7, 44 (Dec. 16, 2014–Feb.
6, 2015) [hereinafter 2014 Recharacterisation Discussion Draft].
129
Id. ¶ 7. The Discussion Draft listed the old “comparability factors,” but
various called them “economically relevant characteristics,” as well as “comparability factors”; see Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 372–73.
130
Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Cᴏ-ᴏᴘᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ
Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Gᴜɪᴅᴇʟɪɴᴇs ғᴏʀ Mᴜʟᴛɪɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Eɴᴛᴇʀᴘʀɪsᴇs ᴀɴᴅ Tᴀx Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴs,
¶¶ 9.20, 9.32 (July 22, 2010).
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Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 373.
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2014 Recharacterisation Discussion Draft, supra note 128, ¶ 88.
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Id. ¶ 89.
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financial position,” which should be “guided by the fundamental
economic attributes of arrangements between unrelated parties,” and
should “comport as closely as possible with the commercial reality
of independent parties in similar circumstances.”134 These provisions substantially reflected the fourth Issues Note of the 2008 Discussion Draft on restructurings,135 provisions which were dropped
in the final version incorporated as Chapter IX.136
The 2014 intangibles deliverable suggested two major inroads
on the “contractual terms” regime, and its significant component,
the “developer/assister” principle.137 The first was clearly adumbrated by the 2012 intangibles discussion draft.138 The second was
not adumbrated, but was strongly suggested by the language of Actions 8 and 10 themselves. The second point was expressed only
obliquely and at scattered points throughout the deliverable.
The deliverable set forth a proposed restatement of Chapter VI
of the Guidelines concerning intangibles in its entirety. The deliverable began with a relatively broad identification of what constitutes
“intangibles,” which the deliverable defines as “something which is
not a physical asset or a financial asset, which is capable of being
owned or controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use
or transfer would be compensated had it occurred in a transaction
between independent parties in comparable circumstances.”139 The
deliverable rejects focus upon legal or accounting conceptions; rejects any requirement that the property enjoy legal protection; and,
while it requires that the item be susceptible of being “owned or
controlled,” and implicitly subject to “use or transfer,” it rejects any
134

Id. ¶ 93.
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Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Asᴘᴇᴄᴛs ᴏғ Bᴜsɪɴᴇss Rᴇsᴛʀᴜᴄᴛᴜʀɪɴɢs: Dɪsᴄᴜssɪᴏɴ Dʀᴀғᴛ ғᴏʀ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ
Cᴏᴍᴍᴇɴᴛ, ¶¶ 194–221 (Sept. 19, 2008-Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter 2008 Discussion Draft on Restructurings].
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See Langbein & Fuss, supra note 7, at 350–61.
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ᴏɴ Tʀᴀɴsғᴇʀ Pʀɪᴄɪɴɢ Asᴘᴇᴄᴛs ᴏғ Iɴᴛᴀɴɢɪʙʟᴇs Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 8: 2014 Dᴇʟɪᴠᴇʀᴀʙʟᴇ (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 Action 8 Deliverable].
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2012–Sept. 14, 2012).
139
2014 Action 8 Deliverable, supra note 137, ¶ 6.06.
135

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

45

requirement that the “something” be separately transferable, thus including items that may be transferable “only in combination with
other business assets.”140 The deliverable specifically rejects any notion that “market conditions” constitute any kind of intangible.141
The report stresses that the process of identifying an intangible is
distinct from the process of determining a price for its transfer and
emphasizes that intangibles must be identified “with specificity.”142
The deliverable thus, while accepting a broad definition, does not
equate “intangibles” with anything so broad as the “profit potential”
suggested by the second Issues Note of the 2008 restructuring Discussion Draft.143 Correspondingly, the deliverable conceives a definition of “income from intangibles” narrower than the broader
meaning discussed in Part I, and surely narrower than the conception
of “intangible income” defined in the GILTI provisions.
The key device by which the deliverable proposes to align allocations with “value creation” involves a distinction between two categories of “transactions”: transactions “involving the development,
enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles,” (DEMPE transactions), on the one hand, and “transactions involving the use or transfer of intangibles,” on the other.144 Both categories are of intercompany “transactions.” The second category is
further subdivided into two categories: transactions “involving
transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles”145 and transactions
“involving the use of intangibles in connection with sales of goods
or performance of services (embedded intangibles transactions).”146
It is by means of the first category–DEMPE transactions–that
the deliverable diminishes the significance of the criterion of “legal
ownership” of the intangible, as well as virtually repudiating the
“developer/assister” conception. In this regard, the BEPS initiative
picks up where the truncated intangibles project left off. The 2014
deliverable says that “the determination of the entity or entities
within an MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the
140
141
142
143
144
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returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial,”
but that “[a]lthough the legal owner of an intangible may receive the
proceeds from exploitation of the intangible, other members of the
legal owner’s MNE group may have performed functions, used assets, or assumed risks that are expected to contribute to the value of
the intangible,” and that such members “must be compensated for
their contributions under the arm’s length principle.”147
The deliverable lists reasons why the determination of what contributions have been made and how to compensate them may be
“highly challenging”148 and outlines the “steps” to be taken in making such determinations. The fourth and fifth steps listed are new in
“arm’s length” lexicology, not reflected either in the prior OECD
Guidelines or the United States regulations: “identifying the controlled transactions related to the development, enhancement,
maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles in light of
the legal ownership of the intangibles under relevant registrations
and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including their relevant
contributions of functions, assets, risks and other factors contributing to the creation of value”; and “where possible, determining
arm’s length prices for these transactions consistent with each
party’s contributions of functions performed, assets used, and risks
assumed.”149
The 2014 deliverable also attaches considerable significance to
what it defines as the “6.56 functions”; certain “important functions
will have special significance.”150 These include “design and control
of research and marketing programs, direction of and establishing
priorities for creative undertakings including determining the course
of ‘blue-sky’ research, control over strategic decisions regarding intangible development programs, and management and control of
budgets”; or “important decisions regarding defense and protection
of intangibles, and ongoing quality control over functions performed
by independent or associated enterprises that may have a material
effect on the value of the intangible.”151 The report suggests special

147
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attention be paid to the methods employed in compensating such
significant functions.152
Those important functions usually make a significant
contribution to intangible value and, if those important functions are outsourced by the legal owner
in transactions between associated enterprises, the
performance of those functions should be compensated with an appropriate share of the returns derived
by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles.153
The second broad manner in which the 2014 intangibles deliverable suggests some retreat from the perceived abuses of the 1990s
system was by suggesting both a limitation on the use of “one-sided”
methods where unique intangibles are involved, and at the same
time, a broadened use of the profit split method. Thus, it suggests
that a “comparability analysis focusing only on one side of a transaction generally does not provide a sufficient basis for evaluating a
transaction involving intangibles (including in those situations for
which a one-sided transfer pricing method is ultimately determined)”;154 that “in matters involving the transfer of intangibles or
rights in intangibles it is important not to simply assume that all residual profit, after a limited return to those providing functions,
should necessarily be allocated to the owner of intangibles”; that
“[t]he selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method
should be based on a functional analysis that provides a clear understanding of the MNE’s global business processes and how the transferred intangibles interact with other functions, assets and risks that
comprise the global business,” that “[t]he transfer pricing method
selected, and any adjustments incorporated in that method based on
the comparability analysis, should take into account all of the relevant factors materially contributing to the creation of value, not only
intangibles and routine functions”;155 that “care should be used, in
applying certain of the OECD transfer pricing methods in a matter
involving the transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles,” and
152
153
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that “[o]ne sided methods, including the resale price method and the
TNMM, are generally not reliable methods for directly valuing intangibles.”156
The 2014 intangibles deliverable at the same time suggested a
greater role for the profit split method. It did so in a bracketed portion of the report—meaning it was subject to further consideration,
particularly in connection with later discussion drafts on Actions 9
and 10—which covered the use of profit split methods both in connection with transfers and licenses of intangible property by one
group member to another,157 as well as in its observation (noted
more fully below) that so-called “one-sided” methods should not be
used in transactions involving unique intangibles,158 and its direction that the presence of value in “embedded” intangibles should be
taken into account as a comparability factor, rather than a separate
transaction.
C.

The Final Reports.
The most significant changes in the Final Reports concern the
provisions of the Guidelines concerning the role of “risk” in the “delineation” of the transactions as to which a transfer price is to be
assigned or determined. The December 2014 Discussion Draft had
demoted the role of “contractual terms” in two principal ways. First,
it re-emphasized that a “comparability analysis” was a two-step process, and that, while “contractual terms” and other factors played a
role in the first step, there was a second step, which examined the
“economic substance” of the terms, and demanded that they comport
with an objective standard of “arm’s length” terms (which might be
conceived or developed in the abstract, rather than necessarily derived from an identified “comparable”).159 Second, it emphasized
“control of risk” as a critical element of such a standard, incorporated an analogue of “people functions,” and an examination of “financial capacity” to assume a risk into determining the place or particular enterprise where risk could be determined to be “controlled.”160
156
157
158
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160
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The Final Reports largely reverse and limit this demotion by setting forth a six-step process for analyzing risk in a transfer pricing
context. The six-step process so defined largely restores a central
role to contractual terms. The first step is to “[i]dentify economically
significant risks with specificity.”161 The second is to determine how
these risks are “contractually assumed” by the associated enterprises
“under the terms of the transaction”162—and this is the key step in
restoring the critical role to “contractual terms.” The third is a functional analysis of how the parties “operat[e] in relation to assumption and management” of these risks, “in particular which enterprise
or enterprises perform control functions and risk mitigation functions, which enterprise or enterprises encounter upside or downside
consequence of risk outcomes, and which enterprise or enterprises
have the financial capacity to assume the risk.”163 The fourth step is
to determine “whether the contractual assumption of risk is consistent with the conduct of associated enterprises and other facts of
the case”164—a considerably narrower expression of the circumstances in which contractual terms may be disregarded or modified
than that expressed in the December 2014 Discussion Draft.
The fifth step is taken only where the contractual allocation is
inconsistent with the parties’ conduct or other facts and involves allocating the risk in derogation of the contractual allocation. The
sixth step is the actual pricing, taking into account risk assumptions
“as appropriately allocated,” and “appropriately compensating risk
management functions.”165
As to the fifth step, the Final Reports note simply that if it is
established by the fourth step that the party, which contractually allocated the risk “does not exercise control over the risk or does not
have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the risk should
be allocated to the associated enterprise or group of associated enterprises exercising the most control.”166 But even in such circumstances, it is very cloudy in its description of what kind of tax ad-
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ministration responses are in order. The Reports conclude, somewhat obscurely, that “[i]n exceptional circumstances, it may be the
case that no associated enterprise can be identified that both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume
the risk,” that “[a]s such a situation is not likely to occur in transactions between third parties, a rigorous analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case will need to be performed, in order to identify the underlying reasons and actions that led to this situation,” and
that “[b]ased on that assessment, the tax administrations will determine what adjustments to the transactions are needed for the transaction to result in an arm’s length outcome,” which may entail “[a]n
assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction” under
the rules governing nonrecognition.167
These rules by their terms restore considerable scope to contractual allocations, as they are a starting point under step two; but in
practice, they are likely to accord even greater scope to those allocations. There are distinct uncertainties in the meanings of both “financial capacity” to assume risks and in identifying the party in a
group which can manage or control risk. This means that in the third
and fourth step there are likely to be serious obstacles in most situations to ever determining a “risk allocation” that is ultimately too
different from what the “contractual” allocations would be. The contractual allocations are likely to withstand any serious attack in
many if not most circumstances.
In contrast to the fate of innovations in the risk/recharacterization Discussion Draft, the basic incremental advances of the intangibles deliverable – the analysis of DEMPE transactions, overriding
“developer/assister” and intangibles-ownership notions, and the
suggestions that profit split approaches rather than “one-sided”
methods may be superior devices in the context of intangibles – survived review and are a prominent part of the final version of Chapter
VI of the revised 2017 Guidelines. But the changes wrought by the
Final Report with respect to “risks” influenced the provisions of the
Final Reports to be included in Chapter VI, almost always in the
direction of revivifying the role of “contractual terms” and diluting
the force of the innovations suggested by the deliverable.
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The 2014 deliverable set forth a “framework for analysing transactions involving intangibles” at the outset of its section on DEMPE,
including a six-step process derived from 2012 Discussion Draft on
intangibles. The first step involved “identifying the legal owner of
intangibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements,
including relevant registrations, licence agreements, other relevant
contracts, and other indicia of legal ownership”; the second “identifying the parties performing functions (including specifically the
important functions [noted above]), using assets, and assuming risks
related to developing, enhancing, maintaining and protecting, and
exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional analysis.”168
The Final Reports changed the language describing these two steps
to “[i]dentify the intangibles used or transferred in the transaction
with specificity and the specific, economically significant risks associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles” and to “[i]dentify[ing] the
full contractual arrangements, with special emphasis on determining
legal ownership of intangibles based on the terms and conditions of
legal arrangements, including relevant registrations, licence agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal ownership,
and the contractual rights and obligations, including contractual assumption of risks in the relations between the associated enterprises.”169 Both sets of changes elevated the role of contractual assignments, including but not limited to, incorporating the six-step
risk-analysis framework, which itself emphasized the role of contract terms.
The deliverable had stated that “[w]hen no written terms exist,
where the contractual terms are ambiguous or incomplete, or where
the factual substance of the transaction as reflected in the conduct of
the parties is inconsistent with the written contracts, the terms of a
transaction must be inferred from the conduct of the parties and the
economic principles that generally govern relationships between independent enterprises,”170 reflecting the idea of the restructuring
project of a conception of market or arm’s length terms dependent
not on actual comparables, but on general concepts. The corresponding provision in the Final Reports states that in these circumstances,
168
169
170
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“the actual transaction must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D.1.1 of
Chapter I),” omitting any such conception of a deduction of an “arm’s
length” division not determined by “comparables.”171
The Final Reports made extensive changes and additions to the
provisions governing the internal allocations with respect to the
DEMPE of intangibles and with respect to the provisions on use of
assets, particularly in relation to circumstances where the party
funding a transaction is not the party in control of the associated
operational risks. These generally confine the funding party to a return on the “funding and risk-taking,”172 narrowing the idea of dispersed “intangibles related returns,” and enhancing the role of allocations to a “central” party. The report changed the provisions governing ex post returns to limit adjustments based on such returns by
directing attention to whether the parties “properly took into account
risks and the probability of reasonably foreseeable events occurring
and that the differences between actual and anticipated profitability
reflects the playing out of those risks,” and noting that “it may happen that financial projections, on which calculations of ex ante returns and compensation arrangements are based, did not adequately
take into account the risks of different outcomes occurring and
therefore led to an overestimation or an underestimation of the anticipated profits.”173
Similar changes reflecting incorporation of the “control of risk”
ideas, which give greater emphasis to contractual allocations, appear
throughout the Final Reports.174 Perhaps the most significant change
the Final Reports make to the earlier deliverable concerns the “central” functions identified in paragraph 6.56175 and the provisions
concerning allocations to a “legal owner” with respect to those functions. The 2014 deliverable provided that “[b]ecause it may be difficult to find comparable transactions involving the outsourcing of
such important functions, it may be necessary to utilise transfer pricing methods not directly based on comparables, including profit split
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methods and valuation techniques, to appropriately reward the performance of those important functions “ It said furthermore that
“[w]here the legal owner outsources most or all of such important
functions to other group members, the entitlement of the legal owner
to be attributed any material portion of the return derived from the
exploitation of the intangibles after compensating other group members for their functions is highly doubtful.”176
The Final Reports rendered what was said to have been “doubtful” to merely something that should be “carefully considered,” saying that “[w]here the legal owner outsources most or all of such important functions to other group members, attribution to the legal
owner of any material portion of the return derived from the exploitation of the intangibles after compensating other group members
for their functions should be carefully considered taking into account the functions it actually performs, the assets it actually uses
and the risks it actually assumes under the guidance in Section D.1.2
of Chapter I.”177
The provisions of the 2014 deliverable concerning limitations of
the “one-sided” methods and on the utility of profit splits, by contrast, were largely carried forward in the Final Reports, except that
in the 2014 deliverable there had been references to the “profit split
method,” without the adjective “transactional.” The Final Reports
are careful to insert the adjective and to confine its references to the
“transactional profit split method.”178
V.

GILTI, FDII, AND BEAT

A.

GILTI.
Section 951A(a) provides that any person who is a United States
shareholder (“USS”) of any controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”)
for any taxable year of the USS must include in gross income the
shareholder’s global intangible low-taxed income (“GILTI”) for the
taxable year.179 Section 951A(b)(1) defines GILTI as the excess of
176
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the shareholder’s “net CFC tested income” (NCTI) for the taxable
year over its “net deemed tangible income return” (“NDTIR”) for
the taxable year.180 Section 951A(b)(2) defines NDTIR as 10 percent of the aggregate of the shareholder’s pro rata share of the “qualified business asset investment” (“QBAI”) of each CFC with respect
to which the shareholder is a USS for the taxable year over the
amount of certain interest expense.181 The amount of that offset is
the amount of interest taken into account in determining the shareholder’s NCTI to the extent the interest income attributable to the
expense is not taken into account in determining the shareholder’s
NCTI.
Section 951A(c) defines NCTI as the excess of the aggregate of
the shareholder’s pro rata share of the “tested income” of each CFC
with respect to which the shareholder is a USS for the taxable year
of the USS over the aggregate of the shareholder’s pro rata share of
the “tested loss” of each such CFC.182 Section 951A(c)(2) defines
term ‘‘tested income’’ as the excess of the gross income of the corporation determined without regard to certain amounts, principally
those constituting or associated with deemed or actual distributions
of “subpart F income” from the CFCs over the deductions properly
allocable to that gross income.183 The term ‘‘tested loss’’ means the
excess of any such deductions over the gross income included in
determining tested income.
Section 951A(d)(1) defines QBAI, with respect to each CFC, as
“the average of the corporation’s aggregate adjusted bases as of the
close of each quarter of the taxable year in specified tangible property used in a trade or business of the corporation, and of a type with
respect to which a deduction for depreciation is allowable . . . .”184
Section 951A(d)(2) defines ‘‘specified tangible property’’ as any
tangible property used in the production of tested income.185 Section
951A(d)(2)(B) provides that if “property used both in the production
of tested income and income which is not tested income,” the property is treated as specified tangible property in the same proportion
180
181
182
183
184
185
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that the gross income included in determining tested income produced with respect to the property bears to the total gross income
produced with respect to the property.186 Section 951A(d)(3) provides that the adjusted basis in any property is determined by using
the alternative depreciation system under section 168(g) and by allocating the depreciation deduction with respect to the property ratably to each day during the period in the taxable year to which the
depreciation relates.187 Section 951A(d)(3) sets forth rules for determining the treatment for these purposes of tangible property held by
a CFC through a partnership.188
Section 951A(e)(1) provides rules for determining pro rata
shares for these purposes.189 Section 951A(e)(2) provides that a person is treated as a USS of a CFC “for any taxable year of the person
only if the person owns (within the meaning of section 958(a)) stock
in the foreign corporation on the last day in the taxable year of the
foreign corporation on which the foreign corporation is a controlled
foreign corporation.”190 Section 951A(e)(3) provides that “foreign
corporation is treated as a CFC for any taxable year if the foreign
corporation is a CFC at any time during the taxable year.”191
Section 951A(f)(1)(A) provides that any amount included as
GILTI is treated as an amount included under subpart F for purposes
of specified provisions of the Code, “income under subsection (a)
shall be treated in the same manner as an amount included under
section 951(a)(1)(A) for purposes of applying sections” certain enumerated provisions of the Code.192 Section 951A(f)(2) provides for
the allocation of the GILTI included by a shareholder among the
CFCs of which the shareholder is a USS, primarily on the basis of
the ratio of the shareholder’s share of the tested income of that CFC
to the aggregate amount of tested income of all the CFCs of which
the shareholder is a USS.193
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It is best before going further to illustrate this provision with a
simple example, which we may use as a building block as the discussion gets more complicated.
EXAMPLE 1.
Assume USP is a United
States corporation which owns all of the shares of
two foreign corporations, CFC1, incorporated in
Country M, and CFC2, incorporated in Country N.
Assume all three corporations have taxable years
which are the calendar year. In 2019, CFC1 has gross
income included in computing “tested income” of
300u, with which are associated deductions of 180u,
and tangible property used in producing this income
and subject to an allowance for depreciation of 800u.
In 2019, CFC2 has gross income included in computing “tested income” of 600u, with which are associated deductions of 360u, and tangible property used
in producing this income and subject to an allowance
for depreciation of 400u.
The “tested income” of CFC1 is 120u: 300u, reduced
by 180u. The “tested income” of CFC1 is 240u:
600u, reduced by 360u. The NCTI is the sum of these
two amounts, or 360u.
USP’s share of the QBAI of CFC1 is 800u. USP’s
share of the QBAI of CFC2 is 400u. The aggregate
of the two is 1200u, and the NDTIR is ten per cent of
that, or 120u.
USP, accordingly, has GILTI for the year of 240u,
360u reduced by 120u. This is included in its income
as a Subpart F deemed distribution.
At the same time it enacted section 951A, Congress enacted new
section 960(d), which provides a foreign tax credit with respect to
any inclusion mandated by section 951A.194 Section 960(d)(1) provides that any domestic corporation which has an inclusion of GILTI
is deemed to have paid foreign income taxes equal to 80 percent of
194
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the product of the domestic corporation’s inclusion percentage, multiplied by the aggregate tested foreign income taxes paid or accrued
by controlled foreign corporations.195 Section 960(d)(2) provides
that the inclusion percentage is the ratio of the corporation’s GILTI
to the aggregate of the tested income over the tested losses of all the
CFCs as to which the corporation is a USS.196 Section 960(d)(3) defines the “tested foreign income taxes” as the foreign income taxes
paid or accrued by the CFCs that are “properly attributable” to the
tested income of such foreign corporation taken into account by such
domestic corporation under section 951A.197
The TCJA amended section 904 to provide a separate “basket”
for GILTI-related foreign tax credits and amended section 904(c) to
disallow any carryover or carryback of GILTI-related foreign income tax credits.198
EXAMPLE 2.
In our example above (Example 1), assume that Country M has an income tax
with a tax rate of 30%, and Country N has an income
tax with a tax rate of 20%. Assume the United States
tax rate is 21%. Assume that the tax base in both
Country M and Country N is the same as the “tested
income” of CFC1 and CFC2, respectively. CFC1
will have tested foreign income taxes subject to the
credit of 36u (30% of 120u); CFC2 will have foreign
income taxes related to GILTI of 48u (20% of 240u).
The inclusion percentage for CFC1 is the GILTI
(240u) divided by the aggregate of the tested income
of the corporations (360u), or 2/3.
USP will include income a total of 296u, the sum of
(x) GILTI of 240u; and (y) taxes deemed paid of 56u
(2/3 of the total foreign taxes of 84u).199 It will have
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creditable foreign taxes of 44.8u (80 per cent of 56u).
USP’s United States tax attributable to the GILTI inclusion is 50 per cent of 21 per cent of 296u, or
31.08u. USP may claim a foreign tax credit of 44.8u,
so that the inclusion in GILTI does not increase
USP’s United States tax liability. The excess of the
creditable taxes over the credit allowed (13.72u,
44.8u reduced by 31.08u) creates neither a tax carryback nor a carryforward. Nor, because of the separate “basket” for GILTI income, may it be used
against any tax on current (same-year) income from
foreign branches, or foreign passive income, or any
other foreign income.
This example assumes relatively high foreign tax rates, with the
result that the foreign tax credit eliminates any United States tax. Let
us do a calculation assuming lower tax rates, including the assumption that CFC2 is a “cash box” in a tax haven with low rates, to
which income has been shifted.
EXAMPLE 3.
The net effect of the GILTI inclusion, with the section 250 deductions, can again
be illustrated by reference to our extremely simple
example set forth above. In Example 2, we assumed
Countries M and N were relatively “high-tax” foreign states with flat rates of 30% and 20%. Let us
make those calculations assuming the foreign states
have relatively low flat rates: assume Country M is a
developed country, with “real” participation in the
transactions with USP, but that it has followed the
TCJA rate reductions by enacting a 15% flat rate. Assume Country N is a “base country” or “tax haven”
or more of the corporation if and when amounts are actually or constructively
deemed distributed by the foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 904 (2017).
Under section 78 of the Code, the amount of the taxes so deemed to be paid are
also included in the income of the distributee. I.R.C. § 78 (2017). As amended by
TCJA, section 78 provides for the inclusion of the foreign taxes deemed paid with
respect to GILTI (under section 960(d)), determined without regard to the 80 per
cent limitation, but with regard to the amount limited by the inclusion percentage.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 906(d) (2017).
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with a flat rate of 5%. CFC1 incurs a tax to Country
M of 18u (15% of 120u); CFC2 incurs a tax to Country N of 12u (5% of 240u). The total foreign tax is
30u; the creditable amount is 80% of 2/3 that (16u).
USP incurs a United States tax of 15.08u. There are
no “excess” credits.
B.

FDII.
The TCJA also enacted a new section 250, providing for a special deduction for “foreign-derived intangible income” (“FDII”) and
GILTI, resulting in a special rate of tax on such income.200 FDII is a
concept parallel to GILTI, but included in the income of a domestic
taxpayer that does foreign business other than in corporate form.
Section 250(a)(1) provides for a deduction of 37.5 per cent of the
FDII and 50 per cent of the sum of the GILTI and the amount included in income on account of any foreign taxes (such as withholding taxes) attributable to actual distributions of GILTI.201 The deduction is limited to the total taxable income of the domestic corporation should the sum of the FDII and the distributed GILTI exceed
the total taxable income. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2025, the deduction for FDII is reduced to 21.875 per cent
and to 37.5 per cent for actual GILTI distributions. 202
Section 250(b) defines FDII as the amount which bears the same
ratio to the “deemed intangible income” (“DII”) as the foreign-derived deduction eligible income (“FDDEI”) bears to the deduction
eligible income (“DEI”).203
DII is defined in a manner that parallels the definition of GILTI
in section 951A(a). The DII is the excess of the DEI over the deemed
tangible income return (“DTIR”): DEI parallels the term NCTI in
section 951A; DTIR parallels the definition of NDTIR in section
200

I.R.C. § 250 (2017).
I.R.C. § 250(a)(1) (2017). Upon an actual distribution by a foreign corporation, the foreign country may impose a tax on the distributee with respect to the
amount of the distribution. In such a case, the distributee, if eligible for foreign
tax credits, may claim both a “deemed paid” credit for the amounts of tax imposed
on the income of the foreign corporation on which the taxes were imposed, and a
credit for taxes imposed directly upon the distributee with respect to the actual
distribution.
202
I.R.C. § 250(a)(1)(A) (2017).
203
I.R.C. § 250(b) (2017).
201
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951A(b). Thus, the DTIR is equal to 10 percent of the corporation’s
QBAI – same definition as in the GILTI provisions, substituting DEI
for tested income. Paralleling, though not replicating exactly, the
definition of tested income in section 951A(c), the DEI is the gross
income of the corporation computed with exclusions for income
from CFCs, including both regular Subpart F inclusions and inclusions with respect to GILTI, as well as financial services income and
foreign branch income, reduced by allocable deductions. The exclusion of financial services income is significant, since foreign operation through branches rather than subsidiaries is most common in
the banking and financial services sectors. The exclusion is unfavorable to financial sector taxpayers, because treatment as intangible
income with respect to branches qualifies the taxpayer for a deduction from taxable income, not an inclusion as in the case of GILTI.
The FDDEI is DEI-derived in connection with property sold by
the taxpayer to any person who is not a United States person, and
which the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary is
for a foreign use, or for services provided by the taxpayer which the
taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary are provided
to any person, or with respect to property, not located within the
United States. The statute defines foreign use as “any use, consumption, or disposition which is not within the United States.” It sets
forth rules for determining when property or services are for foreign
use, including rules for property dispositions or performance of services for unrelated and related intermediaries.
This parallel belies, or obscures, critical differences between the
GILTI and FDII regimes, and in so doing creates some confusion
about the net revenue consequences of this “intangible income” system in its entirety. The most serious consequences flow from the fact
that, while the GILTI provisions limit the foreign tax credits it generates, the FDII provisions do not affect the foreign tax credits
claimable against the income that qualifies for the deduction.
The revenue consequence of the entire “intangible property”
scheme can be apprehended only by looking at what it does with
respect to an entity operating through foreign branches. To do this,
we can use the same numbers used in our examples but assume that
CFC1 and CFC2 are not separately incorporated entities, but rather
branches of USP.
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EXAMPLE 4.
In this scenario, absent the
FDII provisions, USP would have income attributable to the branches of 360u. Using the foreign tax
rates in Example 2 (30% and 20%), USP would incur
36u in Country M tax, and 48u in Country N tax, generating foreign tax credits of 84u. The inclusion of
360u, assumed entirely to be FDII, would generate a
deduction of 135u at 37.5%. Thus, the net inclusion
would be 225u, subject to tax at 21%, generating a
pre-credit tax of 47.25u. The foreign tax credits
would eliminate any U.S. tax, but would leave the
taxpayer with excess credits of 36.75u. There would
be some difficulty using these credits, because the income is foreign branch income, which after TCJA is
placed in a separate “basket.” But they could be used
against other low-taxed foreign branch income (giving the taxpayer an incentive to allocate “intangible”
income connected with other foreign operations to itself rather than any foreign subsidiaries). The excess
credits could also be carried forward or carried back.
Using the foreign tax rates in Example 3 (15% and
5%), USP would incur 18u in Country M tax, and
12u in Country N tax, generating foreign tax credits
of 30u. Thus, USP would have United States tax liability of 17.25u, and 0 foreign tax credit available for
carryback or carryover.
The net consequence of the overall scheme is appreciated by
comparing what happens to USP (in consequence of the combined
GILTI/FDII regime) as between operating through foreign branches
or foreign subsidiaries. Using the Example 2 (relatively high) rates,
the United States tax after the foreign tax credit is zero whether the
parent operates through branches or subsidiaries. This is true even
though, on account of “territoriality” and the reduced United States
rate, the pre-credit United States tax is much higher where the parent
operates through a foreign branch. But in the branch case, in addition to paying no tax, the parent has potentially valuable credits
36.75u. Using the lower Example 3 rates, by contrast, the parent
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operating through branches pays a slightly higher after-credit United
States tax (17.25u vs. 15.08u).
These admittedly oversimplified numbers suggest an opportunity for tax planning; companies will be better operating through
branches to the extent their foreign operations are more heavily
taxed and through subsidiaries where their operations are more
lightly taxed. This is neither new nor surprising, at least at first
blush: under the pre-TCJA non-territorial system with its “overall”
foreign tax credit, branches were preferable for operations subject
to higher foreign taxes and subsidiaries in lower-taxed environments. What may be surprising is that, with the addition of
GILTI/FDII, the post-TCJA “territorial” system retains (or reintroduces) this feature: under territoriality, with the supposed exemption
of foreign income, the level of taxation of foreign operations should
not affect the choice of form for the operations. But the partial inclusion of intangible income limits this feature. At the same time,
however, the overall operation of the FDII/GILTI system, though on
its surface it appears to raise revenue and limit tax avoidance opportunities may do just the opposite – it may lose revenue and create
new planning and avoidance horizons.
This does not mean, at least in terms of first order effects, that
the overall scheme of the TCJA is a net revenue loser. The amount
of income that will be subject to the GILTI provisions presumably
greatly exceeds that that will be subject to the FDII provisions. But
first order effects are not static. The overall set of provisions create
planning opportunities, which may make it advisable for firms to
convert operations conducted through foreign subsidiaries to branch
operations, reducing the GILTI inclusions and taking advantage of
the tax reduction effected by the FDII rules. And, given the existing
United States “check-the-box” choice of entity regulations,204
switching between branch and subsidiary operations may present
fewer nontax obstacles than one might at first assume.
C.

BEAT.
The TCJA205 also enacted a new minimum-type tax, dubbed the
“base erosion anti-abuse” tax (sometimes the “BEAT”). As the
204
205

See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701–1(a)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3.
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 § 12001 (2017).
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GILTI/FDII aimed at profit shifting in the “outbound” situation—
the foreign activities of United States corporations—the BEAT
aimed at low-taxed income in the “inbound” situation—the United
States activities of foreign-based taxpayers. The BEAT is structured
in a manner that parallels the alternative minimum tax (“AMT”), in
effect after 1985 until it was repealed by the TCJA. The AMT proceeded by recomputing taxable income by adding back in certain tax
“preferences” and “adjustments” and then proceeded to apply a rate
lower than the “regular” rate to the enhanced amount of taxable income so computed. The resulting tax was then compared to the “regular” rate, and the higher rate is imposed. The BEAT proceeds by
recomputing taxable income not by folding preferences or adjustments back in, but by disallowing deductions for certain payments
to related foreign parties. A lower than normal rate is then applied
to the enhanced, recomputed income figure, compared to the tax resulting from the higher rate but diminished base, and the higher rate
is imposed.
The add-on tax equals the “base erosion minimum tax amount”
(“BEMTA”) of each “applicable taxpayer.”206 The BEMTA is the
excess of 10 percent of the modified taxable income (“MTI”) of the
taxpayer over the regular tax liability (“RTL”).207 The offset for the
RTL is itself reduced by an amount attributable to credits claimable
against RTL. The amount of the reduction is complex, but tangential
to this discussion. The MTI is the taxable income computed without
regard to any “base erosion tax benefit” (“BETB”) with respect to
any base erosion payment (BEP), or the base erosion percentage of

206

I.R.C. § 59A(a) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A(b)(1)(A) (2017). For taxable years beginning in calendar year
2018, the percentage is 5 percent. For any taxpayer that is a member of an affiliated group which includes a bank as defined in section 581 or a securities dealer
registered under the Exchange Act, the percentages applied to MTI in computing
BEMTA are 6 percent for taxable years beginning in 2018, and 11 percent for
years beginning between January 1, 2019, and December 31, 2025. I.R.C.
§ 59A(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2017). For taxable years beginning after that, the percentages
are 12.5 percent for taxpayers which are not members of an affiliated group which
includes a bank or securities dealer, and 13.5 percent for taxpayers who are member of an affiliated group which does include either of those entities. I.R.C.
§ 59A(b)(2)(A) (2017).
207
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any net operating loss deduction allowed under section 172 for the
taxable year.208
There are four categories of “base erosion payments.”209 The
first includes any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party of the taxpayer and with respect
to which a deduction is allowable.210 The second includes any
amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is
a related party of the taxpayer in connection with the acquisition by
the taxpayer from such person of property of a character subject to
the allowance for depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation).211 The third includes any premium or other consideration paid
or accrued by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related
party of the taxpayer for any reinsurance payments which are taken
into account under sections 803(a)(1)(B) or 832(b)(4)(A).212 The
fourth includes certain payments to “expatriated entities” which result in a reduction of the gross receipts of the taxpayer.213 These are
payments to any surrogate foreign corporation which is a related
party of the taxpayer, but only if the payee first became a surrogate
foreign corporation after November 9, 2017, or any foreign person
which is a member of the same expanded affiliated group as the surrogate foreign corporation.214
Payments are not included in the first category that meet the requirements for the use of the services cost method under the section
482 regulations,215 determined without regard to the requirement

208

I.R.C. § 59A(c)(1) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A (d) (2017).
210
I.R.C. § 59A (d)(1) (2017).
211
I.R.C. § 59A (d)(2) (2017).
212
I.R.C. § 59A (d)(3) (2017).
213
I.R.C. § 59A (d)(4)(A) (2017).
214
I.R.C. § 59A (d)(4)(B)-(C) (2017).
215
The services cost method of the transfer pricing regulations essentially provides that, in the case of services performed by one corporate entity for or on
behalf of an entity when the two are under common control (as defined in the
section 482 regulations), an “arm’s length” or appropriate charge for the services
may be determined by an allocation of the cost of the services, without imputing
any “profit element” to the provider of the services. The rules are intended generally to apply to the provision of routine services (such as stewardship of a subsidiary, or accounting services for an integrated enterprise), hence the normal re209
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that the services do not contribute significantly to fundamental risks
of business success or failure, if the amounts constitute the total services cost with no markup component. 216
A BETB means:
With respect to the first category of BEPs, any deduction allowed for any base erosion payment;217
With respect to the second category, any deduction allowed
for depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation) with respect to the property acquired with the payment;218
With respect to the third category, any reduction in premium
income under section 803(a)(1)(B) and any deduction under section
832(b)(4)(A) from the amount of gross premiums written;219
With respect to the fourth category, any reduction in gross
receipts with respect to the payment in computing gross income.220
The base erosion percentage is determined by dividing the aggregate amount of base erosion tax benefits of the taxpayer for the
taxable year by the sum of the aggregate amount of deductions allowable to the taxpayer for the year plus the base erosion tax benefits
allowed with respect to the third and fourth categories of base erosion tax payments.221 The denominator does not include deductions
with respect to FDII or GILTI income, the deduction for dividends
from 10 percent owned foreign corporations, or the deduction for
net operating loss carrybacks or carryovers.222
An applicable taxpayer is a corporation other than RIC, REIT,
or S corporation with average annual gross receipts for the three taxable years ending with the preceding taxable year of $500 million or
more and for which the base erosion percentage is three percent or
more.223 Gross receipts of a foreign person include only those taken

quirement that the services not contribute significantly to management of the fundamental risks of the business. The services cost method, and the prerequisites for
its application, are set forth at Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(as amended in 2011).
216
I.R.C. § 59A(d)(5)(A)-(B) (2017).
217
I.R.C. § 59A (c)(2)(A)(i) (2017).
218
I.R.C. § 59A (c)(2)(A)(ii) (2017).
219
I.R.C. § 59A (c)(2)(A)(iii) (2017).
220
I.R.C. § 59A (c)(2)(A)(iv) (2017).
221
I.R.C. § 59A (c)(4)(A) (2017).
222
I.R.C. § 59A (c)(4)(B) (2017).
223
I.R.C. § 59A (e)(1) (2017).

66

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

into account in determining ECI.224 All corporations that are aggregated as a controlled group are aggregated for purposes of determining gross receipts, except that the exception for foreign corporations
in determining inclusion in a controlled group does not apply.225 If
the gross receipts of a United States person are aggregated with
those of a foreign person, all of the gross receipts of the United
States person are counted; the limitation to gross receipts giving rise
to ECI does not apply with respect to the gross receipts of the United
States person.226
A related party, for purposes of this provision, includes any 25
percent owner of the taxpayer, any person related under section
267(b) or 70(b)(1) to any such 25 percent owner, and any other party
related to the taxpayer under the section 482 regulations.227 A 25percent owner is any person who owns 25 percent of more of either
the total voting power of all classes of stock, or the total value of all
classes of stock, applying section 318 attribution rules, except substituting 10 percent for fifty percent for purposes of section
318(a)(2)(C). Moreover, the entity attribution rules are not applied
to consider a United States person as owning stock owned by a nonUnited States person.228
Section 59A(h) provides an exception for certain “qualified derivative payments” (“QDPs”).229 The exception is defined in a complex manner and again is tangential to our discussion here.
For taxable years beginning after 2025, the provision is applied
by substituting 12.5 percent for 10 percent and by reducing the offset
for the regular tax liability by the full amount of the allowable credits.
Although it does not, like the GILTI and FDII provisions, speak
expressly in terms of “intangible income” or “intangibles,” the
BEAT provisions are focused on the avoidance of tax on cross-border income. This can be illustrated by an example parallel to the examples sketched above with respect to GILTI/FDII. Again, we can
keep things simple.
224
225
226
227
228
229

I.R.C. § 59A (e)(2)(A) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A (e)(3) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A (e)(2)(A) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A (g)(1) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A (g)(2)-(3) (2017).
I.R.C. § 59A (h)(1) (2017).
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EXAMPLE 5.
Suppose foreign parent (FP)
owns all the stock of a United States subsidiary
(USS) and a subsidiary in a third country (BCS). Assume that the taxable income, apart from any base
erosion payments, of USS is 300u, and that it has
payments to BCS of 180u, all of which would qualify
as base erosion payments. Suppose the payments are
purported royalties with respect to intellectual property ownership of which has been vested by FP in
BCS.
The taxable income of USS is 120u, which is subject
to a flat rate of 21%, so that the regular tax is 25.2u.
The modified taxable income is computed without
regard to the deduction for the payments to BCS, so
it is 300u. The BEMTA is the excess of (x) 10% of
300u (30u), over (y) the regular tax (25.2u), or 4.8u.
VI.
BEPS V. TCJA
As noted above, the peculiar feature of the enactment the GILTI,
FDII, and BEAT provisions is their proximity in time to the promulgation of the final BEPS documents, while they represent initiatives quite different from those recommended (or mandated) by
BEPS. Yet both initiatives appear to aim at the same difficulty—
”base erosion” and “profit shifting”—with an emphasis on avoidance of tax on income that is in whatever sense “intangible.” This
raises the question of comparing how and the extent to which each
of the different initiatives would alter the tax consequences of a situation presenting the common difficulty each address. We can use
the simple examples set forth in Part VI to do this.
At the outset, however, one must address a problem that grows
out of the twin characteristics of BEPS, and indeed of the OECD
Guidelines as a whole, of concomitant indefiniteness and extensiveness. We shall do this with some simplifying assumptions. We will
focus on two and only two key changes BEPS made to the Guidelines. The first are the changes made to Chapter VI of the Guidelines
concerning intangible property; in particular, the principle that all
subsidiaries contributing to the development of an “intangible” are
to be compensated currently for their contributions, notwithstanding
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the centralization of “ownership” of the intangible in any one or
more separate subsidiaries. The second are the changes made to
Chapter I of the Guidelines concerning control of risk, including the
decision-making capacity concerning the assumption and management of risk, and the financial capacity to absorb risk. Both of these
measures aim at diffusing returns throughout an affiliated group in
response to an effort by the taxpayer group to centralize it, ordinarily
in a low-tax jurisdiction.230
We can begin by using the example involving USP, CFC1, and
CFC2 set forth above. Let us assume Country N is substantially a
tax-haven “base country,” and that CFC2’s gross income is all “intangible” or “residual” income in the sense we have employed
throughout. In order to assume that the BEPS Chapter VI principles
would be meaningfully involved, we have to assume that some or
much of this income is “intangible” in the sense that it is imputable
to actual intangible property, in the manner set forth in the postBEPS Guidelines. We also assume that the results stipulated in our
example reflect a transfer pricing result based on rules/principles of
the pre-BEPS Guideline or the United States regulations, and that,
thus, they are dominated by “contractual allocation” and “developer/assister” or “intangible ownership” notions, which result in the
allocation of the lion’s share of income from the “intangible” to
CFC2.

230

We will not concern ourselves here terribly with the choice of any transfer
pricing “method.” This is because we will assume that, once returns have been
dispersed under either the intangibles rules or the risk rules, the allocation outcome will be the same whether we use a series of “one-sided” methods to determine a return to the variously dispersed “FAR” factors, on the one hand, or a profit
split method the terms of which are based on how we have determined the FAR
factors to be dispersed.
Additionally, it is important in making these comparisons not to become distracted by the question of tax rates, other than to recognize that we should limit
any opportunity for undermining the effectiveness of base-protection rules by manipulation of rates. Some of the discussion in Part VI questions the effectiveness
of the TCJA initiatives on the basis of the tax rates used (or deductions allowed
as a method of adjusting rates). We should recognize, however, that the basedefining properties of the provisions may have merit which is disguised or counteracted by the actual provisions because of the low rates or high deductions employed.
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Because we are going to be comparing the overall, i.e., the
“global” tax results under various regimes, we need to add some numerical assumptions to the above example, namely for USP’s domestic income. Assume USP’s domestic income is 300u. Assume
throughout that the “tested” income is the same as taxable income
in all countries and assume the tax rates set forth in Example 3—
15% for CFC1 and 5% for CFC2. Assume a rate of 21% for the
United States. On these assumptions, the USP group’s total tax liability (worldwide), computed without regard to the GILTI inclusion,
would be the sum of 63u (21% of 300u); 18u (15% of 120u); 12u
(5% of 240u), or 93u. Its “global” effective tax rate would be
14.091% (93u as a percentage of its total global income of 660u).
As indicated in Example 3, to this the GILTI provisions would add
15.08u, increasing the global tax liability to 108.38u, and the global
effective rate to 16.42%.
Now, in order to analyze how BEPS principles would apply to
this situation, we have to make some simplified assumptions. In the
example as set forth above, CFC2 has “tested income” of 240u. Let
us assume that we can determine that 160u of this income is attributable to an item of intangible property, K, and that another 60u is
attributable to risks associated with the business that are “controlled,” in the sense indicated by the BEPS Final Reports on Actions 8-10, in equal shares by USP and CFC1. Assume, too, that of
the 160u of income attributable to item K; 40u would be absorbed
by a payment to CFC1 for CFC1’s contributions to the DEMPE of
K and that 100u of the income would be absorbed by a payment to
USP for USP’s contributions to the DEMPE of K.
Thus, without GILTI in the United States or adoption of BEPStype rules in any country, the “global” tax burden of the USP group
is the sum of 63u in the United States (21% of 300);
We can reallocate the income of the group in accordance with
these assumptions. There is no need to specify which of the transfer
pricing “methods” we are using—profit split or a series of “onesided” methods—because the outcome will be same regardless of
method, because the entire allocation is effected by our “reconstruction,” or “delineation” to use the OECD’s phrase, of the transaction.
Under this recalculation, CFC2’s “tested” income is 20u—its prereallocation amount of 240u, reduced by the 160u allocated to USP
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and CFC1 on account of the intangible property, and the 60u reattributed on account of control of risk. This would generate a tax liability of 1u to CFC2.
CFC1’s income would be increased by the allocation to Country
M of 30u on account of the “control of risk” criterion of the BEPS
Final Reports, and the allocation of 40u on account of the Chapter 6
intangible property rules of those Reports. Accordingly, CFC1’s income increases from 120u to 190u. This generates a tax of 28.5u to
CFC1.
USP’s income increases by the allocation to the United States of
30u on account of “control of risk,” and the allocation of 100u on
account of the intangible property rules. This generates an additional
tax of 27.3u to the United States on account of this “intangible” income.
On these assumptions, the USP group’s total tax liability (worldwide) (assuming there is no GILTI tax) would be the sum of 90.3u
(21% of 430u); 28.5u (15% of 190u); and 12u (5% of 240u), or
130.8u. Its “global” effective tax rate would be 19.818% (130.8u as
a percentage of its total global income of 660u. The increase in the
global tax burden on account of the BEPS adjustment is 37.8u.
We saw above (Example 3) that the unilateral United States
adoption of GILTI/FDII would increase the global tax by 15.08u and
the global tax rate by 2.429%—compared to these increases of 37.8u
and 4.827%. Thus, global adoption of BEPS principles—even
though those principles can be viewed from many perspectives as
concessionary and limited—would increase the overall taxation of
the group by many multiples of the increase effected by the unilateral United States measure, adopted without change in transfer pricing rules in the directions suggested (or mandated) by BEPS.
A similar demonstration can be made with respect to the BEAT.
Let us assume, in a manner parallel to our assumptions in the GILTI
examples, that a United States subsidiary (“USS”) of foreign parent
(“FP”) is essentially in the same position as CFC1 in the GILTI examples and that between USS and FP is BCS, in a position like that
of CFC2. Thus, we assume net income, before BEAT, of 240u in
BCS, and 120u in USS. But assume that these results reflect a payment of an amount that would constitute a base erosion payment
(“BEP”) under the BEAT provisions, in the amount of 200u.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

71

Ignoring the credit complexities of the BEAT computation, assume that the regular tax liability (“RTL”) of USS is 21% of 120u,
or 25.2u. The modified taxable income would add the 200u payment
back into income, resulting in MTI of 320u. The BEMTA is the excess of 10% of the MTI over the RTL, or 32u, minus 25.2u, resulting
in a BEMTA of 7.8u. Thus, the total tax on FP’s foreign subsidiaries
would be 32u plus 5% of 240u (12u), the tax imposed by Country
N. If one made the adjustments under BEPS suggested above, one
would add 70u to the income of USS; and 130u to the income of FP;
and reduce BCS’s income by 200u. This would result in an increase
of USS’ tax of 14.7u; and of FP’s (at a 15% rate) of 19.5u. The total
increase of 34.2u is more than four times the increase effected by
the BEAT.
These observations are subject to numerous objections, but most
can be addressed without impeachment of their central point. First,
it may be that the comparison of unilateral adoption of the TCJA
measures to multilateral adoption of BEPS is unfair. But under alternative comparisons, the result—that the TCJA measures are quite
weak—is not altered. We might compare unilateral adoption of the
TCJA measure to the unlikely prospect of unilateral adoption of
BEPS principles (by Country M, in our example). But the numbers
above give that comparison. In the GILTI case, BEPS increases the
United States tax by 27.3u, compared to the increase of 15.08u under
GILTI, a 180% difference; in the case of BEAT, the U.S. tax increase of 14.7u is more than twice the 7.2u increase effected by
BEAT. In the more likely case of unilateral adoption of BEPS by
the foreign developed authority without adoption by the United
States, the comparison in terms of the increase in foreign taxes, versus the TCJA-mandated increases in United States tax (10.5u vs.
0.3u in the GILTI case; 19.5u vs. 7.2u in the BEAT case) still
hold.231
In the latter case, too, some additional considerations must be
noted concerning potential second order effects. If the foreign
higher-tax country follows BEPS and thereby enhances its tax base,
under the territorial system applicable to the corporate context, this
231

Appendix II shows the changes in global tax liability in two alternative
situations: (1) where the United States applies the GILTI tax, and Country M unilaterally applies BEPS; and (2) where the United States and Country both apply
both the GILTI and BEAT provisions.
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should be a matter of indifference to the United States, as in our
example, the increase occurs because of an adjustment between
CFC1 and CFC2. But the increase in foreign taxes will occur without an increase in income treated as a foreign source for United
States purposes. This will mean that the increase in foreign taxes
enhances the foreign taxes that may be claimed as credits against
United States tax. But those taxes are not claimable with respect to
income in foreign corporations that is not subject to the GILTI tax
and are of limited value even if the income is subject to the GILTI
provisions. But they are much more valuable if the income is earned
through an unincorporated branch or other noncorporate entity and
that income can be protected further through the FDII deduction.
This creates incentives for the United States parent to liquidate its
foreign entities and operate through branches, something which the
United States “check-the-box” rules232 greatly facilitate. If U.S.based entities engage in such tax strategies, then the applicable
transfer pricing regime could invite scrutiny under the AOA provisions, which are still “tougher” than the Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
even as the latter have been amended by BEPS. Such inquiry could
be complicated, since, as noted above, United States law has never
taken the slightest cognizance of the OECD work on the AOA.
In addition, as noted above, if pursued on a widespread basis,
this could result in revenue losses that might exceed the limited revenue gains from the application of the GILTI rules. In any event,
these second order effects could magnify the extent to which the
amount of “shifted” profits recaptured by BEPS exceed the amount
recaptured by GILTI/FDII, if the latter system is taken as a whole.
A second objection to the example above, and the conclusions
drawn from it, concerns whether it overestimates the magnitude of
adjustment that might be mandated by BEPS, particularly with respect to the question of “control of risk.” As the discussion above
clarifies, there is considerable ambiguity in the BEPS report, as there
has been throughout the Transfer Pricing Guidelines since the mid1990s. Some of this ambiguity may be deliberate or necessary to
secure multilateral agreement or consent to the terms of the Guidelines. The numbers given in the Example for the adjustments mandated by the BEPS innovations are of course assumed and arbitrary
232
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in the sense that there is no empirical basis for proving that the orders of magnitude they reflect are realistic or representative of
amounts to which actual results would correspond. Nevertheless,
they probably reflect, realistically, at least the outer or maximum
limits of the results of applying BEPS. It is true that experience
teaches us that such outer limits are likely to be considerably in excess of what tax authorities would be able to establish, or even to
assert, in tax controversies with taxpayers. But the magnitude of the
difference between what these assumptions yield as potential revenue harvests, and what is generated by GILTI/FDII/BEAT, means
that even substantial overestimates of what the BEPS rules would
warrant would not seriously undermine or overthrow the conclusion
that BEPS compliance would have a significantly greater reach in
subjecting “residual” or “intangible” profits to taxation by some nation where “value” is “created” than would the innovations of the
TCJA.
A third objection to the example above and its implications concerns the relatively low tax rates (or high deductions mandated by
section 250), or, in the case of GILTI and especially FDII, the availability and usefulness of foreign tax credits. The simple argument
would be that the TCJA innovations would produce greater revenue,
relative to the potential of the BEPS changes, if only the tax rate
applicable to the inclusions mandated by GILTI/BEAT were higher,
and approximated, or equaled, the rates applicable to corporate profits generally. In most discussions of transfer pricing, we tend to
avoid discussions of tax rates and to treat the question as one of defining an appropriate base (or bases) of taxation. Again, however,
the response concerns the magnitude of at least the potential difference between what BEPS yields and what the TCJA changes yield.
Moreover, while to a serious extent the question is one of the design
of measures to capture “intangible” income, a primary question here
is the question of actual United States policy at the current time toward the taxation of such income. To the extent the latter is at issue,
the actual rates, available deductions, and foreign tax credit rules are
very much at issue and need to be analyzed as they were enacted,
not as they might otherwise be designed.
The discussion above yields, in summation, a troubling conclusion about United States policy. The provisions adopted by the

74

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

TCJA—the GILTI, FDII, and BEAT provisions—bear the appearance of responses to the problem of “base erosion” and “profit shifting.” They do this pursuant to international mandates—by the G-20
and the OECD—for member states (and others) to take measures to
address these problems, identified by those bodies as important and
international in scope. But they do not conform to the particular
measures recommended and adopted by those bodies. And on closer
inspection, they appear to be drastically weaker in their potential to
combat the problem than the recommended measures—and this is
in view of the fact, that, from many standpoints, the recommended
measures are weaker than what many experts, and indeed many
member states, sought to achieve.
This pattern recapitulates patterns observable in the past, notably
in the revision of the United States regulations and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the early and mid-1990s. There the Congress mandated a tightening of the rules, and rules were developed
which originally appeared to affect the greater restrictiveness thus
called for. The final rules, too, appeared to promise restriction, but
beneath the surface created opportunities for tax avoidance significantly in excess of what had existed before, and the course of practice led to widespread exploitation by taxpayers of these opportunities. The international bodies, notably the OECD, exhibited awareness of and concern for these developments. The United States,
however, not only exhibited little such concern, but actually appears
to have promoted this form of tax leniency, increasingly diverging
from OECD recommendations and an emerging international consensus outside the United States. This raises question of what real
United States policy is and has been, and how it might be shaped in
the future.
VII. UNITED STATES POLICY
The question of United States tax policy and international intangible income, currently and going forward, can be addressed only
by understanding what has happened with respect to the taxation of
such income since the revolutionary tax reform was enacted in 1986.
The two interludes during which transfer pricing rules evolved
in the period since World War II—in the 1960s and 1985-95, both
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originated with congressional action in the United States. The reforms of the 1960s began in 1962 when the Kennedy Administration
proposed “ending deferral”—that is, taxing currently the foreign
earnings of all foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations on
a “passthrough” basis.233 The proposal garnered no meaningful support in Congress, but resulted in action with respect to two partial
measures.234 The first was the enactment of the Subpart F provisions, which “ended deferral,” but only of the “base country” and
passive income of subsidiaries to which income might be said to
have been shifted. The second was the transfer pricing initiative. But
that initiative was never written into statute. The House bill which
became the Revenue Act of 1962235 included a provision that would
have mandated something very much akin to a formula apportionment regime for United States subsidiaries.236 But the final enactment removed this in accordance with a promise from the Treasury
Department that the matter could be handled administratively under
section 482, without further statutory authority.237
In similar fashion in what became the Tax Reform Act of
1986,238 the House Report expressed concern about the shortcomings of the then prevailing transfer pricing regime, but the Congress
wrote into statute only a “super-royalty” provision paralleling an
amendment to section 367 that had been enacted in 1984.239 The
House Report expressed considerable dissatisfaction with “the effectiveness of the ‘arm’s length’ approach,”240 and the Conference
Report directed a Treasury study,241 provided by the 1988 White Paper.242 But the ultimate revisions to the regulations were such that
their results involved no meaningful base broadening reform, but
233
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rather an actual significant tax cut, amounting to a near exemption
for the global “residual” income of multinationals. In this regard,
transnational corporations enjoyed an effect of the 1986 Act that was
denied any other sector of the economy. The 1986 Act effected significant reductions in maximum tax rates—from 50% to 28% for
individuals, 46% to 34% for corporations. But the overall statute
was supposed to be “revenue neutral”—the rate reductions were to
be offset by measures which broadened the base of the tax. But for
“global intangible” income—the transfer pricing “residual”—the
net result was both a reduction of rates and a narrowing of the tax
base.
Moreover, the 1986 Act rate reduction coupled with base broadening reform in the United States became an international model:
most major foreign countries enacted parallel reductions in maximum corporate rates, a major feature of the “globalization” initiatives that ensued after the end of the so-called Cold War. When the
United States-originated “contractual terms” pseudo-reform was
embraced by the OECD, this phenomenon—of a major reduction in
the tax burden of multinational corporations, with rate reductions
coupled with heavily disguised base narrowing rules—became a
worldwide occurrence.
Since the mid-1980s, there has been widespread interest in, and
coverage of, transfer pricing matters in the United States in academic literature; in excellent periodical (daily, weekly, or monthly)
professional services materials both covering tax matters or international tax matters generally, or even transfer pricing in particular;243
and, to a lesser but still significant extent, in the daily general and
financial press.244 But for all that attention, focus on the pertinent
issues narrowed after the finalization of the revision of the OECD
Guidelines in 1995-96. As to academic literature, there came to be a
fairly common scholarly view, perhaps not generally accepted but
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still widely held, that the arm’s length method was flawed as a theoretical matter and should be discarded in favor of some form of
formula apportionment.245 But this literature came to have something of an unrealistic, howling-at-the-moon quality: it largely either
ignored or offered no options with regard to the solid official and
private opposition to any departure from the fundamental premises
of existing practices. At the same time, it did not confront any details
of the changes that had been made by the new Guidelines, of the
new tensions and differences between the international and the
United States rules, and of the manner in which the new rules were
being implemented and the efforts of the OECD to accommodate
some of the fundamental concerns implicated in the objections to
“arm’s length.” In this regard, the academic literature may have partaken of the more general tendency in the period of at least legal
academic literature to be increasingly unconcerned with matters of
practice and application, as opposed to abstract and self-referential
theory, a tendency often observed in academic literature concerning
legal education as well as in the general press.
But even the professional periodical coverage of the matter in
this period became quite oblivious of certain important matters,
namely the manner in which practice under the new regulations and
Guidelines was degenerating into wooden elevation of “contractual
terms” analysis and of the complex efforts of the OECD to exert
pressures to counter such developments. Moreover, at least some of
the publications involved, many of which had historically been sympathetic to reform efforts, drifted to positions much more protective
of corporate and taxpayer interests.246 As suggested throughout, official activity in the area took little cognizance of the progressive
aspects of the OECD’s AOA and restructuring projects. And transfer
pricing largely disappeared as a matter of interest to the daily financial or general press.
There was some change in this situation in the late part of the
first decade of the new century and the early part of the second decade. This is the period that constituted the immediate prelude to the
rise of international concern about profit shifting. Most important
245
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were articles in the general press detailing the widespread pattern of
very light taxation imposed on some United States-based multinationals, primarily the largest and most important technology companies, although also including some retail firms (e.g., Starbucks).247
Advocacy favoring fractional apportionment became more frequent
and intense. A former head of the United States advance pricing
agreement program, who had long forcefully defended the “arm’s
length” system, switched sides and became a supporter of a formula
system.248 And the prestigious Brookings Institution, through a prestigious Hamilton Project which made generally progressive proposals concerning a wide range of economic matters, issued a recommendation for a “residual” formula apportionment system,249 although the report roughly replicated a proposal detailed almost two
decades earlier during the “transfer pricing wars.”250
Even officially, there was some movement toward strengthening
the taxation of the foreign income of United States-based multinationals. Legislation enacted in 2010 made complex reforms of the
foreign tax credit system.251 These reforms were regarded as changing the foreign tax credit from one which was “better than exemption,” to one with some real teeth. Some suggested it was these reforms that provoked the international business community into
much more serious advocacy of and lobbying for movement to the
“territorial” system ultimately adopted by the TCJA.252 In the later
part of this period, prompted by both the academic literature and the
247
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press reports, there were congressional hearings that became part of
the initiatives that led to BEPS.253
Even in the face of these developments, however, there was little
appetite for examining in detail the transfer pricing issue and particularly the details of the arm’s length system as it had degenerated
into the system dominated by “contractual terms.” The academic literature on “stateless income” tended to focus on features of the domestic law of particular countries that facilitated subjecting entities
organized in developed country jurisdictions to “global” taxation by
tax haven jurisdictions—the so-called “double Irish” and “Dutch
sandwich” structures. They did not highlight the role of the transfer
pricing rules and “contractual terms” in creating “stateless income”
even among entities organized under the normal corporate laws of
the nations involved, without any special structures or other “harmful tax practices.”254 When the European Union took action against
certain members for “subsidizing” companies with these practices,
the focus was on particular laws or particular countries which could
be characterized as “harmful”; there was a natural tendency to look
away from rules that had been internationally agreed upon and for
which there could thus be no basis for imputing blame to any particular member state.
By the middle of the century’s second decade, however, most of
the energy represented by these earlier efforts had dissipated, along
with enthusiasm for serious changes in connection with BEPS. Serious consideration of these matters in the academic literature
largely disappeared; indeed, what are perhaps the two most prominent academic publications devoted to tax matters have rarely published pieces tilting toward the anti-arm’s length position, while
more frequently highlighting pieces taking the opposite side.255 Similarly, the periodical professional services have exhibited a steady
drift toward taking the taxpayer/corporate side.256 The courts, meanwhile, and particularly the Tax Court, have been stringently on the
253
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taxpayers’ side; the IRS has valiantly pursued a litigation strategy
attempting some strict reading of existing rules, nevertheless meeting a nearly unbroken string of defeat in litigation.257
Finally, in connection with the TCJA and the lead up to it, the
business community won virtually unqualified victories in the enactment of “territoriality” and “repatriation.” It is part of the mission
of this article to demonstrate that GILTI, BEAT, and FDII are not
significant “qualifications” to these victories. Although the Democratic members of Congress all but unanimously voted against the
TCJA, the business community enjoyed a near monopoly of discussion in the general and financial press of the issues for years prior to
the enactment of the TCJA, characterizing “territoriality” as essential to “restoring” competitive balance between United States-based
and other enterprises, and “repatriation” as necessary to providing a
capital base for the expansion of domestic job creation and business
activity. The Democratic or progressive opposition gave only the
quietest of voice to the quite substantial grounds for refuting such
arguments.
In all these circumstances, it is possible to give a brief yet comprehensive statement of what United States policy is with respect to
the taxation of international “intangible” income. That policy is that
the amounts determined to be the “residual” income of multinational
corporations—the excess of the total profits of an integrated group
over the sum of all “marginal” returns accorded to the “functions,
assets, and risks” which can be definitely associated with individual
component enterprises of the group—should be virtually exempt
from taxation by any country. This is true even though virtually no
party would explicitly advance that proposition in those terms publicly. But it is the implicit policy of the United States, expressed both
in contemporary statutory provision and in the outcome of disputes
which arise in the area. It is certainly implicit in the adoption of a
“territorial” system without serious tightening or enforcement of
257
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transfer pricing rules. It is implicit in the strict insistence on predicating transfer pricing analysis on “contractual terms” unilaterally
determined by the central management of the private groups. It is
implicit in the string of decisions by the courts circumscribing any
administrative ambition in the interpretation or application of regulations. And it has been the principal objective of this article to show
that, far from contradicting or undermining any such policy, the
combination of apparently restrictive innovations of recent statute—
the GILTI, FDII, and BEAT provisions—when closely analyzed actually reinforce the policy.
Nor is there realistic prospect of any change in this policy. Republican legislators and politicians are generally hostile to any effort
that might increase the tax burdens of larger corporations. Democratic legislators have historically supported such efforts, but it was
a Democratic Administration that hastened to restrain the international bodies from the material changes they initially advanced in
the BEPS process. Moreover, there are increasing suggestions, particularly from the political “right,” that the major United States technology companies have become some kind of favorites of the Democratic Party or the “left.” There is considerable evidence of this,
which includes the Obama Administration’s effort to restrain BEPS,
and the circumstance scrambles the traditional understanding of the
politics of corporate taxation in general and transfer pricing in particular.
On the subject of the relationship of the technology companies
with forces on either end of the political spectrum, there is another
major set of considerations to take into account in assessing the future course of transfer pricing policy. It has long been recognized,
and is emphasized especially by Professor Richard Vann of Australia, that transfer pricing is the core issue of international taxation
and that it generates far greater “heat” than any other international
tax issue.258 It has been suggested, by myself and others, that this
circumstance is generated not only by the substantial amounts of
revenue potentially involved, but also by concerns about proprietary
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and other nonpublic corporate information.259 Formula apportionment could be administered only by permitting, indeed requiring,
the tax authorities to gather a wide range of information about a
global corporate group; and that information could or would be
made available to the tax authorities of a wide range of countries.
Concerns about proprietary and nonpublic information can be
expected only to intensify in the coming years. Enterprises situated
in developed countries have for many decades possessed valuable
technological and other proprietary information protected by their
home country laws and the laws of other developed countries with
which they do business. The country of whose enterprises this is truest is the United States. But developing or emerging countries have
since then began to “emerge” after World War II, taking a more restrictive view of the protection of private information, particularly
technological information, and frequently advocating “technology
transfer” from the private companies to companies in their jurisdictions, or even to their governments. The question of protection of
intellectual property and “technology transfer” are at the heart of the
current ongoing trade discussions between the United States and
China.
Increasingly and inevitably, the United States views China as its
most important global competitor and views the advanced technology of United States based companies as among its most important
long-term advantage in counterbalancing China’s advantages in
other areas, most notably China’s far larger population. There is,
without regard to this circumstance, a gulf between the views of the
two countries in relation to transfer pricing: China, really alone
among the G-20 countries, is willing to suggest openly the potential
acceptability of formula apportionment, which would probably entail abrogation of the “separate enterprise” standard of the model and
bilateral income tax conventions.260 These problems of information
gathering, information exchange, and technology protection can
only widen and deepen this gulf, making real progress on the definition of the international tax base more, rather than less, problematical as time goes by. Indeed, these difficulties have in all likelihood
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already exerted influence in the matter. They probably lay behind
the United States’ delayed but ultimately adverse reaction to the
BEPS initiative, and the transformation, before and during that initiative, of the role of the United States as the world’s foremost champion of reform and progressive change in international transfer pricing policy, to the world’s foremost obstacle to such change. For better or worse, the United States has become the latter.

